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ABSTRACT 
China’s markets liberalized as it forced its  system to align with W TO standards.  
A 2004 study exam ined China’s agriculture m arkets to determ ine if China continued to 
liberalize after joining the WTO.  It found China did liber alize and assessed this would 
continue.  Coinciden t with join ing the WTO, China participated in th e Doha agriculture 
negotiations.  In 2003 a nd 2006 the negotiations collapsed and in 2008, China sided with 
India and talks co llapsed again.   Had Chin a reverted to protectionism, moving fro m 
market liberalization?  W hat did liberaliza tion indicators and negot iations stances from 
2003 to 2008 tell about China’s liberalization efforts? 
Since 2003, China m et WTO obligations earl y and was not prepared to further 
lower market access barriers.  In negotiations, the sticking point was and continues to be 
developed members’ large domestic supports, subsidies, and special benefits.  Statements 
also point to a em erging developing nations ’ alliance which support China and India.  
With this support, the G-20 will continue to act as the developing world’s nego tiator.  
The opportunity exists for these m embers to for m a trade bloc to control developed 
member m arket distortions.  This c ould adve rsely affect United States  far mers as they  
face higher tariffs and decreased market access abroad. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A nation has two options available to feed its people.  It can grow food 
domestically, or obtain it internationally through trade and farmland acquisition abroad.  
This simple observation has larger implications when looking at a country and how it 
interacts with the international market.  The People’s Republic of China (PRC) under 
Mao Zedong pursued a food policy that emphasized food self-sufficiency, as evidenced 
in the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and subsequent state grain procurement quotas.  After 
1978, reforms under Deng Xiaoping exposed China to the world market, though state 
grain quotas and other price control measures remained.  Was Beijing ready to shift from 
state control of domestic production and use the market to feed its people?   
It appeared so.  Following lengthy negotiations, China successfully joined the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, and continued to liberalize trade 
and open its markets to the world by eliminating non-trade barriers (NTB) and reducing 
tariffs.  After joining, Beijing completely supported the WTO initiative to separate 
agriculture into its own series of negotiations to proceed in parallel with negotiations in 
the other trade areas.  In a short two year period, the trade and domestic reforms 
implemented to support WTO commitments showed positive effects in China and 
continued the 1979 reforms initiated by Deng.   
But during ministerial negotiations in Cancun, Mexico, in 2003, agricultural 
negotiations stalled, not restarting again until August 2004.  There were too many 
divergent issues and views, and China, as one of the largest agriculture players, could 
potentially be adversely affected if more developed countries did not have to reduce 
domestic supports and export subsidies.  Would China back away from liberalization and 
move towards protectionism?  How would Beijing react to stalemates in negotiations?  
Specifically, what do agricultural trade data and Beijing’s stance in agricultural 
negotiations since 2004 reveal, with regard to the question of whether China is continuing 
agricultural liberalization or retreating towards protectionism?  
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A. MARKET LIBERALIZATION PATHS  
Beijing had two major options to consider when the agriculture talks collapsed in 
Cancun, Mexico, in 2003.  It could continue along its path of trade liberalization and 
agriculture reform and open its markets to the world through elimination of trade barriers 
and reduction of tariffs.  Or it could retrench its position and adopt a belligerent stance in 
negotiations, using the argument that it had made major concessions just to enter the 
WTO; because it had made the concessions, it was time for the developed countries to 
reciprocate.  It could then delay further negotiations and adopt a protectionist behavior.  
Continued liberalization or protectionist retrenchment were the two major policy options 
it could adopt and then support such policy in future negotiations. 
If China continued liberalization, then domestic agricultural policies and land use 
should change as China procured more land intensive foodstuffs from the world market.  
Trade policy should encourage acquisition of food from the world marketplace.  In 
commodities where there is low domestic capacity—such as sugar—imports should 
surge.  World food exporters and importers alike would need to prepare for the effects on 
demand by China’s entrance to the WTO and by the increased wealth of Chinese 
consumers.  
Conversely, if China reinforced its attempts at domestic food protection, such 
changes would also be reflected in international negotiations, trade policy and domestic 
land use.  Contrary to the idea of relying on the market for food supply, such changes 
could indicate Beijing’s reliance on protectionism for food security, contrary to the spirit 
of WTO.  The PRC and the Chinese Communist party (CCP) under Mao had a long and 
colorful tradition pursuing such a goal, with limited successes and tragic results. 
Tracing Beijing’s position since 2004 will reveal whether Beijing has been 
consistent in its agricultural trade policy and whether its policy is geared towards 
protectionism or the free market.  Examining WTO negotiations, ministerial statements, 
and trade data may indicate the degree to which Beijing is legitimately adopting WTO 
requirements to encourage free trade and integrate with the agricultural world market. 
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B. ROOTS OF COMPETITIVENESS: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
The main method and structure for this thesis was inspired by the 2004 co-
authored analysis by D. Rosen, S. Rozelle, and J. Huang, Roots of Competitiveness: 
China’s Evolving Agricultural Interests.  It evaluated Chinese market liberalization, 
agriculture negotiations and their trends through 2004.  The report provided an excellent 
background to the Chinese position through the Cancun agriculture negotiations 
stalemate in 2003.  It is well worth updating the areas identified by the authors to 
determine market trends.  It is also worth examining the various predictions the authors 
made regarding agriculture, and assessing whether these predictions held true based on 
the update of the market indicators used by the authors.  
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized in several chapters.  This first chapter has introduced the 
question:  Can agricultural trade data and Beijing’s stances in agricultural negotiations 
since 2004 reveal if it continues agricultural liberalization or is retreating towards 
protectionism?  The second chapter of the thesis provides background to Chinese market 
liberalization.  It also provides a historic overview of past world negotiations, briefly 
discusses pertinent issues that must be kept in mind during the study of China’s market, 
and provides a comprehensive literature review. 
Chapter III of the thesis reviews the co-authored study and presents its various 
domestic arguments and data points through 2004.  Each indicator is updated and a 
preliminary assessment of the trend observed is provided.  Chapter IV provides a similar 
handling of Chinese agriculture negotiations as presented in the Rosen et al. study.  It 
discusses the observed trends, presents updated information, and evaluates whether the 
trend supports liberalization or is a retrenchment to protectionism.   
In Chapter V, the thesis draws a basic conclusion of whether China is sliding back 
to protection or continues along its path of trade liberalization and reform.  It provides a 
basic assessment on why China reacted as it did in July 2008, and the implications of the 
updated market liberalization trends.    
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II. BACKGROUND OF CHINESE AGRICULTURE AND THE 
MARKET 
Before evaluating Chinese market liberalization, it is helpful to look at the 
background of Chinese accession into the WTO and its participation in agriculture 
negotiations, discuss some of the pertinent issues of the Chinese agriculture market, and 
review what has been written before.  Lastly, it will be helpful to briefly cover the entire 
Rosen et al. study, looking beyond trends and indicators.  
A. HISTORY OF  PRC AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS  
In 1986, Beijing commenced negotiations to assume membership in the 
international General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) organization, fifteen years 
after formal membership to the United Nations.  The GATT seat was initially held by the 
Republic of China (ROC), as one of the 1947 founders of GATT, but withdrew in 1950 
following the ROC defeat on the mainland by PRC forces.  Beijing preferred to resume 
the GATT membership vacated by the ROC, but the United States and the European 
Economic Community wanted Beijing to apply as a new member. 
Following fifteen years of trade negotiations with the United States and all other 
members, the PRC joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), GATT’s successor, in 
December 2001.  It agreed to remove many non-trade barriers and lower import tariffs.  
These steps implied that Beijing was prepared to continue along the path of trade reform 
toward liberalization and continued to move away from the non-market economy that 
dominated prior to 1978.   Beijing negotiators agreed to large import tariff cuts and 
elimination of many non-trade barriers, all geared to lower import prices into China.  In 
return, Beijing no longer had to deal with the yearly trade talks with its major trading 
partners which were often influenced by political and other non-trade related issues and 
generated uncertainty every year as to what the level of trade would be. 
At the same time as Beijing made a bid to rejoin GATT, GATT members 
participated in a series of talks, from 1982-1994, to resolve emergent issues that were 
either not covered in the original GATT agreement or amend the 1947 agreement.  The 
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world’s largest trade talks commenced in 1982 and had a four-year completion target.  
The talks continued to stall around agriculture.  In 1986, after failing to generate an 
agreement, the GATT members came together again in Punta del Estes, Uruguay, and 
began another round of talks focused on the GATT system itself and items not covered in 
GATT—intellectual property, the trade of services, subsidies, and the more standard 
issues of agriculture and the textile trade.  The 1990 ministers’ meeting in Brussels, 
which was supposed to end the negotiations, did not produce an agreement.  Agriculture 
was the sticking point.  The round continued and only after the United States, the 
European Union, Japan, and Canada came to a consensus on some issues was the trade 
round concluded.  The Marrakesh Agreement was signed in Morocco in April 1994.  
Agriculture issues had been tabled and it was agreed in 1994 to resume agriculture 
negotiations at a later date.  The Marrakesh Agreement updated the 1947 GATT 
document and on 1 January 1995, GATT transitioned to become the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
China was dealing with accession negotiations in the midst of these larger 
negotiations which explained why its accession agreement contained larger tariff cuts and 
stipulations than previous countries’ commitments.  It also was not allowed the same 
price-distorting protection clauses that had been acceptable under GATT.   Such 
distortions had not been eliminated by the latest rounds of trade talks, but no party 
involved desired to grant China the same distortion allowances.  Agriculture trade talks 
commenced in November 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Conference, with a goal to finish 
in 2005.  China joined the WTO in December 2001, and immediately participated in the 
agriculture talks, which had been named the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).     
In 2003, talked resumed in Cancun, Mexico, but collapsed after only four days of 
negotiations.  A South Korean minister committed suicide in protest of the developed 
nations’ agriculture subsidies which highlighted the emotion of the round.  The G-20 
trading bloc emerged during this round of negotiations as well, with the PRC, India, 
Brazil, and South Africa joining together with other developing nations in an 
international forum.  Talks recommenced in Geneva in 2004, with an agreement to 
achieve a framework for an agreement.  In November 2004, a Cotton Sub-Committee 
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(SCC) was formed to separate cotton from other agriculture issues, because cotton was 
used in textile production and not as a food source.  It had separate issues attached to it 
that would delay other agriculture negotiations so it was broken out of the general DDA 
talks.  Little new progress was made at Paris in 2005.  World ministers met in Hong 
Kong in December 2005, as the deadline approached to conclude talks.  No agreement 
was made but the deadline was extended to 2006.  Ministers again met in Geneva in July 
2006, but talks again collapsed.  The major sticking point remained developed nations’ 
massive domestic supports compared to the small developing nations’ subsistence 
markets.  Ministers met again in Potsdam in 2007 to try and reach an agreement before 
President Bush’s trade authority granted by the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 expired.  
Domestic supports and subsidies continued to hamper any agreement.  The United States 
2008 Farm Bill included huge domestic supports and subsidies, and the European Union 
continued its massive supports as well while a food crisis gripped the developing world 
from rises in the cost of fuel and other production factors.1 
In July 2008, am idst spiraling food pr ices, a collapsing f inancial system , and 
market chaos, m inisters m et in Geneva to  try to com e to an accord.  Once a gain, 
subsidies, dom estic supports, and now speci al safe guard m echanisms that dev eloped 
countries had to help weather such trad e crises all were st icking points in the 
negotiations.  China openly sided with India on all issues and the talks collapsed.  Having 
weathered four years of stalled and collap sed negotiations, woul d C hina con tinue to  
liberalize in the face of a chaotic system?     
B. ISSUES SURROUNDING STUDYING AGRICULTURE POLICY  
Many issues surround the study of Chinese agriculture and are present in 
negotiations.  Such issues must at least be considered when looking at the trade data of 
food stuffs flowing in and out of China and when reading the minister’s statements.   
Food policy changes may be confused with larger transition issues.  Barry 
Naughton laid out China’s dual problem of transition from an agricultural to industrial 
                                                 
1 A complete background of GATT / WTO negotiations, issues, and locations can be found on the 
WTO website at www.wto.org.  The site provided an in depth look at all the various meetings and 
discussed the relevant issues of the day.   
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society while it is at the same time moving from a command economy to one based on 
market principles.2  Such transition issues have side effects in agriculture.  With a dual 
transition occurring in China, it will be important to consider whether a change follows 
from predictable progress in industrial development and the switch from command to 
market economy, or whether it is a consequence of implementing Beijing’s negotiated 
agreements for entrance to the WTO.  
Looking at the negotiations also brings about its own set of issues regarding 
China.  China had just completed accession negotiations when the agriculture round 
began.  Beijing’s initial silence in the opening rounds should not be attributed to lack of 
interest but more towards negotiations fatigue—something that various agriculture 
chairmen will attribute collapsed or unproductive agriculture talks to later.  It must also 
be considered that Chinese central decision making inhibits ministerial representatives 
from diverting from previously agreed stances without going back to Beijing for 
guidance.  So any negotiation has to survive not only the informal agriculture meetings 
and formal negotiations rounds but also has to be processed through the Chinese 
bureaucracy.  Fatigue and bureaucracy are both slowing the process down. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping unlocked the door to Chinese markets as one measure to 
reverse the damages done to China by Mao’s policies of self-sufficiency in his quest for 
autarky.  Since then, China has imported and exported various amounts of food and 
fertilizer.  Comparing the export numbers of grain and vegetables with the import of 
fertilizer and dairy products does not clearly indicate a pattern to determine Chinese food 





                                                 
2 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press, 2007), 5-6. 
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and then negotiations at the various WTO trade rounds provide an opportunity to perhaps 
discern what China’s food policy goals are today and how Beijing could respond to a 
future crisis.   
Prior to any such hypothesis, one must first understand the literature dealing with 
topics influencing food policy analysis and WTO effects.  The first literature topic 
compares theories of economic efficiency through comparative advantage with those on 
food security through domestic production.  The next topic looks at how Beijing’s overall 
economic goals can impact investment in agriculture.  Additionally, much has been 
written about WTO membership and it is useful to understand the arguments for and 
against Chinese involvement and the effects membership could have on food policy.  
Finally, it is necessary to identify key agriculture economists’ opinions on food security 
and agriculture and identify the main sources of data primarily used for agricultural 
analysis.  It is useful to note food policy is a topic often included inside larger works on 
the Chinese economy, books on social stability, or publications dealing with Chinese 
strategic goals rather than as a stand alone product. 
Beijing’s food security policy seems to revolve around the dilemma between the 
question of economic efficiency versus domestic self-sufficiency.  Trade theories solved 
the problem of food efficiency (the most efficient use of resources to feed its own 
people), without considering food security (the assurance of food supply in the event of 
market failure).  This consideration has implications in any nation’s need to feed its 
people in its quest for food security, for economists often recommend options that would 
most likely increase a nation’s efficiency.  The emphasis on efficiency is heavily 
influenced by the economic theorists, who believed that the most efficient allocation of 
resources should be based on a nation’s comparative advantage.  
British political economist Adam Smith (1776) attacked the British policy of 
mercantilism in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  Smith 
focused on markets and their ability to meet the needs of buyers and sellers.  British 
economist David Ricardo (1817) built upon Smith’s theory of trade and the importance of 
labor in Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.  He introduced the idea of 
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comparative advantage: that a nation should export those goods it had in abundance and 
could produce cheaply and import those that it lacked or could not manufacture cheaply.     
Comparative advantage theory is important to understand because the basic idea 
of comparative advantage heavily influences neoclassical economists’ recommendations. 
Neoclassical economists recommend China stop producing land intensive low labor crops 
like corn, wheat, and cattle and instead produce low land but labor intensive crops like 
rice and vegetables.  Based on the premise of optimization of resources and profit to 
achieve efficiency supported by free trade, neoclassical economists recommend Chinese 
policy-makers rely on the world markets to import land-intensive agricultural products to 
meet China’s needs.  Kenneth Lieberthal (2004) summarized the effect of this option this 
way: “Foreign access to China’s agricultural markets should also force changes in crops 
grown so that China takes greater advantage of its comparative advantages in labor-
intensive cultivation and puts less emphasis on land intensive grains.”3  But this theory 
and its proponents disregard national security and self-sufficiency.   
Opposite to the efficiency theories, food supply problems and food security were 
also debated by another 18th century economist.  Thomas Malthus (1798) put forward the 
idea that food supplies could not possibly keep up with population growth rate in Essay 
on the Principals of Population.  He rejected the idea that free trade could solve a 
nation’s food supply requirements.  Food security was assured domestically, not through 
trade for in war and famine; each nation would look after its own desires and manipulate 
the market accordingly.  Malthus’s ideas combined with free trade arguments have other 
economists taking up Malthus’s alarmist argument again, considering China’s potential 
impact on world food supply.  
Lester Brown is a modern-day Malthusian.  Brown (1995) argued that “the world 
is now on a demographic and economic path that is environmentally unsustainable.”4  
That thought permeated his book, and continued in a paper, “Beyond Malthus: Sixteen 
                                                 
3 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China From Revolution Through Reform, 2nd Edition  (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004), 271. 
4 Lester Brown, Who Will Feed China: Wake Up Call for a Small Planet (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1995), 19. 
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Dimensions of the Population Problem,” to build on the theory that for demographic 
reasons, China’s domestic food demand would overtax world supplies.5 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) acts as a 
counter-balance to Brown and the Worldwatch Institute.  Supported by such economists 
as Justin Yifu Lin, Jikun Huang and Scott Rozelle, the OECD in 1996 published a 
collection of essays China in the 21st Century: Long-term Global Implications.  The 
predicted impact on world food supplies by China was much less grim than Brown’s 
Malthusian stance; “it appears that China will neither empty the world grain markets, nor 
become a major grain exporter [and China] will most likely determine whether the 
production-demand gap turns into a major agricultural crisis, or whether it will become 
an opportunity to develop the nation’s food economy.”6  OECD economists see that 
technological advance and improvements in efficiency will feed both China and the 
world. 
Is China’s food policy influenced by comparative advantage or by finite food 
supply theories?  Are Chinese policy-makers aware of these debates and embrace some 
economic ideas over others?  Dali Yang (1996) provides one possible answer to the 
question.   He focused on the role the GLF famine played on senior policy-makers.   
Published in the same period as Brown’s book and the OECD report, it sheds some light 
on the way the Chinese government approached food security issues.  Yang cited Chinese 
survey figures provided by Vice Minister of Agriculture Ma Zhongchen (served from 
1990-1992) that highlighted a dramatic increase in population and decrease in farmland 
from 1952-1990.7  This knowledge indicated, contrary to Brown’s claim, China 
leadership had put in place institutions to closely monitor food production prior to 1995. 
Unfortunately, Yang’s book does not provide an answer to what Chinese policy goals 
were or how Chinese leaders felt about relying on the market place to feed their people. 
                                                 
5 Lester Brown et al., “Beyond Malthus: Sixteen Dimensions of the Population Problem,” Worldwatch 
Institute (1998), http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/EWP143.pdf  (accessed September 2008). 
6 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, China in the 21st Century: Long-term 
Global Implications (France: OECD, 1996), 86. 
7 Dali Yang, Calamity and Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 247. 
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A vast amount of literature has been written on the economic goals of China, and 
there is near unanimity amongst economists, social scientists, and political analysts that 
China’s government is focused primarily on maintaining economic expansion and 
growth.  Nicholas Lardy (2002) expressed this argument best: “Although China’s leaders 
have hotly debated many of the details of economic reform, the view that economic 
growth is the sine qua non for retaining political power seems almost unanimous.”8  
Bruce Dickson (2003) highlighted how far the government could go when he referenced 
Jiang Zemin’s 2001 proposal to allow private businessmen into the CCP.  He wrote 
“since the key task of the party for more than two decades had been promoting economic 
growth, [private entrepreneur membership] seemed like an eminently logical proposal.”9  
For the party secretary to even suggest such a thing indicated how deeply the need for 
continued economic success influenced the Chinese government.  Even the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) “Report on the Implementations of the 2007 Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development and on the 2008 Draft Plan for National Economic 
and Social Development” released in March of 2008 placed maintenance of “the good 
trend of steady and fast economic development” as the number one goal in 2008.10    
How should agricultural policy support this goal?  As discussed previously, 
neoclassical economists insist that China focus on labor- intensive agricultural production 
in order to achieve efficiency, instead of continuing to protect land for land- intensive 
food production (for the purpose of achieving food self-sufficiency.  But again this 
neoclassical economic argument does not triumph over China’s ideological concern for 
food security. 
Has the Maoist ideological legacy of self-sufficiency been replaced by the market 
in Beijing’s food policy?  Bruce Reynolds suggested that perhaps market preferences 
gained dominance in food policy.  Reynolds (1984) wrote that  
                                                 
8 Nicholas Lardy, Integrating China into the World Economy (Washington: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2002), 11. 
9 Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1. 
10 National People’s Congress, “Report on the Implementations of the 2007 Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development and on the 2008 Draft Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development” (2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/20/content_7827893.htm (accessed July 
2008). 
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…official policy still stresses the ideological desirability of self-reliance 
and the strategic dangers of excessive grain imports.  But China’s [grain 
import] practice does not appear to differ markedly from that of any other 
land-scarce less developed country.  If anything, China’s level of grain 
imports seems distinctly higher.11   
Conversely, China’s 1996 white paper on the grain issue, probably written in response to 
Brown’s book, is laced with ideological statements of self-sufficiency.12  So has Beijing 
shifted grain policy since then and is that reflected in China’s WTO trade negotiations 
stance regarding agriculture and food grain? 
Additional literature explores the pros and cons of Chinese accession into the 
WTO.  Nicholas Lardy (2002) provided the most supportive argument for WTO entry.  
He identified the likely institutional changes through efficiency gains and structural 
reforms that would continue to support Chinese economic growth.  In 2006, he continued 
China WTO economic assessments for a larger web project entitled China: the Balance 
Sheet.13  In the project’s flagship book, he stated “China’s WTO commitments are further 
enhancing the role of the market, particularly in financial, distribution, and other 
services.”14  He further explained the challenges facing the various economic institutions 
for continued reform.  Additionally, he reinforced the comparative advantage theory and 
used it to show how China has properly adjusted some agricultural import/export 
inefficiencies without dealing at all with the policy or security implications.   
Margaret Pearson’s (2006) work on China and the WTO with regard to 
agriculture also mentions the ambiguity of Chinese negotiations and whether they fell 
                                                 
11 Bruce Reynolds, “China in the International Community,” in China’s Foreign Relations in the 
1980’s, ed. Harry Harding (Yale: Yale University Press, 1984), 88. 
12 Information Office of the State Council Of the People's Republic of China, “The Grain Issue in 
China,” (Beijing, October 1996),  http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/grainissue/index.htm (accessed 
September 2008). 
13 This is a joint project by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and The Peterson 
Institute for International Economics http://www.chinabalancesheet.org/ (accessed August 2008). 
14 Nicholas Lardy, “China’s Domestic Transformation: Democratization or Disorder?” in China: The 
Balance Sheet, Fred Bergsten et al. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2006), 22. 
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into the food protectionist or free trade category.15  She views Beijing’s entry into the 
WTO as a good thing for China and necessary from a Chinese foreign policy point of 
view to counter the other global powers.  Economist Barry Naughton (2007) highlights 
Chinese economic gains created by access to commodities and foreign direct investment.  
He too draws on the premise of comparative advantage and argued that cheap labor 
determined China’s direction of industrialization.  Naughton highlights that China 
commenced farmer protections in 2003 and 2005, but does not speculate whether that is 
part of the government’s attempts to raise rural income in order to maintain social 
stability, or because of self-sufficiency concerns.16 
Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross (1997) together present two other theories 
regarding trade and joining the WTO.  Their arguments considered the motivations for 
Chinese entry to the WTO.  China looked to the WTO as a relief from having to 
renegotiate a most favored nation (MFN) clause with the United States every year and the 
uncertainty surrounding the outcome.  This argument is also forwarded in Margaret 
Pearson’s essay, throughout Nicholas Lardy’s works, and mentioned as a significant 
motivation by Supachai Panitchpakdi and Mark Clifford’s in 2002.17  Nathan and Ross 
took this argument one step further to point out two items.  First, China was doing well 
with trade to the United States bilaterally; WTO membership would likely enlarge the 
trade deficit and potentially exacerbate tensions with the United States.  Second, keeping 
such a large trader outside the WTO would adversely impact the WTO.18  (Perhaps the 
WTO needed China more than China needed the WTO?)  Nathan and Ross further 
speculated that WTO membership had little to do with trade but was part of China’s 
agenda to rise as a global power.19  This was also speculated by Robert Sutter in 2000, 
                                                 
15 Margaret Pearson, “Lessons from China’s Early Years in the World Trade Organization,” in New 
Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), 258-259. 
16 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press, 2007), 133-134. 
17 Supachai Panitchpakdi and Mark L. Clifford, China and the WTO: Changing China, Changing 
World Trade (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2002), 79-80; Pearson, 250. 
18 Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, Inc., 1997), 164, 171-175. 
19 Nathan and Ross, 134. 
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who wrote that China’s WTO membership was part of its agenda to foster in a multi-
polar world where the United States was no longer the sole power.20 
How would Chinese agriculture production be affected by WTO membership?  
Supachai Panitchpakdi and Mark Clifford’s 2002 book provided the best general 
assessment of what could happen.  They predicted urban migration would increase, with 
an increase in productivity in the manufacturing and service sectors.  This increased 
migration would contribute directly toward the reduced number of workers available to 
agriculture as farming became more efficient.21  Naughton agreed with this prediction on 
increased migration and how it will lead to further urbanization.22  Kenneth Lieberthal 
(2004) provided additional predictions on which regions of China will best survive this 
urbanization trend (the poor west and rich east) and mentioned the increased strain such 
migration will place on social networks.23  Douglas Zeng (2005) provided a counter 
argument.  He saw the current land tenancy and industrial make-up of China as an 
inhibitor to migration and increased efficiency.24 
The effects of WTO accession on China’s food production are partially covered 
by Barry Naughton and Loren Brandt who focused on farm protections and the gains to 
be made in agriculture.  Naughton pointed out that the WTO agreement limited Beijing’s 
ability to continue agricultural protectionism in the form of subsidies, artificial price 
increases, or tax breaks.  He further argued that after two years of formal membership, 
China had already attempted to protect their farmers.25 However, he did not speculate 
whether this was for protection from foreign competition or whether this was in response 
to rural poverty.  Was it because of a food security policy or out of concern for rural  
 
                                                 
20 Robert Sutter, Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States (Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 151. 
21 Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 166. 
22 Naughton, 126-131. 
23 Lieberthal, 271. 
24 Douglas Z. Zeng, “China’s Employment Challenges and Strategies after the WTO Accession,” 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 3522 (February 2005), 11. 
25 Naughton, 133-134, 268-269. 
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unrest?  Loren Brandt took a more optimistic position on the effect of WTO accession 
and argued potential gains in efficiency would result from foreign direct investment, 
technology import and technology transfer.26 
The final body of literature identifies agricultural production as a reflection of 
food security policy; particularly grain output, food consumption, and acreage of land in 
use for grain production since reform.  Agricultural economists Scott Rozelle, Loren 
Brandt, and Lester Brown focus on what Naughton identified as the three agricultural 
inputs necessary to increase agricultural production: seed variety, fertilizer, and irrigation 
(water).27  Naughton demonstrated the efficiency gains to be made from the transfer of 
technology in each of these inputs, thus technology is a crucial element in increasing the 
effectiveness of these inputs.28  Any improvement in grain production should take into 
account arable land, farm labor, agricultural capital, seed, fertilizer, water, and 
technology.  Any change in these factors must be evaluated for its positive or negative 
effect on agricultural output and its greater effects on China’s food security policy.  
Social stability, political instability, or climate change in the rest of the world can also 
affect China’s food security. 
Factors contributing to agricultural production instability are also easily 
identifiable.  Z. Y. Zhou and G. Wan (2007) agreed with Malthus’s population and 
supply factors, adding unstable and unpredictable world markets as the third main source 
of insecurity.29  Dali L. Yang added weak agricultural foundations and low access to 
resources to this list.30  Economist Loren Brandt (1997) focused on population growth 
and the stresses industrialization placed on agriculture.31  Lester Brown better defined 
this industrialization stress as rapid industrialization leading to a loss of cropland 
                                                 
26 Loren Brandt, “Reflections on China’s Late 19th and Early 20th Century Economy,” The China 
Quarterly no. 150 (June 1997), 285. 
27 Naughton, 35. 
28 Naughton, 256. 
29 Z. Y. Zhou and G. Wan, “The Public Distribution Systems of Foodgrains and Implications for Food 
Security,” in Food Insecurity, Vulnerability and Human Rights Failure, ed. Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis, 
Shabd S. Acharya and Benjamin Davis (Palgrave MacMillan: UN University, 2007), 106. 
30 Yang, 247. 
31 Brandt, 283. 
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concurrent with the rise in income of urban residents and increased consumption.32  With 
these main works considered, the factors that contribute to instability and must be taken 
into account regarding domestic food security include: population growth, farmland loss 
due to industrialization competition, unpredictable world markets, weak farming 
institutions, low access to capital, and the increased demand for food caused by the rise in 
urban incomes. 
Finally, it is important to identify the key databases used by economists and 
agriculture analysts.  While there are many non-profit and for profit organizations that 
provide analysis of world agriculture data, the definitive expertise is found in the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).  Focused on poverty 
reduction and agricultural practices worldwide, FAO has studied the food problem since 
1945.  FAO is strongly dependent on the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) world production data that also includes reports provided from the Foreign 
Agricultural Service (FAS) of the USDA with offices in the majority of food producing 
countries worldwide. 
The preceding literature provides a solid and comprehensive understanding of 
China’s food policy and its relationship with the WTO in the agricultural sector.  
Understanding the inherent theory bias of analysts when compared to the possible 
Chinese motivations for WTO accession and trade liberalization is important.  It 
highlights the differences between economic and political solutions.  Anticipating the 
potential effects of joining the WTO highlights the different domestic and international 
costs.  Understanding the factors that make up food security and food instability better 
prepares one for the larger discussion at hand, especially after the latest Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) talks collapsed in 2008.  Economists highlight the 
economic advantage while the bureaucratic negotiator has to consider the political and 
domestic costs. 
                                                 
32 Brown (1995), 13. 
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D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Primary and secondary source materials have been used to advance the argument 
of the thesis.  The main source materials are the Chinese negotiating stances found in the 
official statements and minutes from the WTO meetings.  The preponderance of trade 
data have been pulled from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the USDA’s 
Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS).  The PRC statements and proposals have been 
assessed based on their likely impact on food prices and subsequent trade.  Trade data 
have been used to determine whether export/import of various foodstuffs increased or 
decreased following a market change.  Two overall questions are considered throughout: 
How does this piece of evidence affect food trade and does it indicate a policy of 
protection or reform?  What impact could this have on Chinese market liberalization? 
It is useful to note that this thesis looks only at trade negotiations and minister 
level statements to determine what the central governments food policy goals are.  It does 
not consider implementation of any Chinese policy statement.  Much work has been done 
to highlight the regional disparity in implementing policy at the local level as well as the 
key players in any policy implementation.  Only the negotiations patterns and statements 
are analyzed, but not the problems of implementation.  The center sets the strategy to the 
advantage or disadvantage of locally focused governments. 
E.  ROOTS OF COMPETITIVENESS: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
Daniel Rosen, Scott Rozelle, and Jikun Huang, in their 2004 book Roots of 
Competitiveness: China’s Evolving Agriculture Interests, evaluated the changes China’s 
trade and domestic production underwent to meet WTO commitments.  Using the trade 
pillar system broadly used by DDA negotiators (Market Access, Export Subsidies, 
Domestic Supports), the report showed how Chinese markets were liberalizing and that 
Beijing was meeting its WTO accession agreements ahead of schedule.  Based on the 
available data at the time, Rosen et al. assessed that China would continue to liberalize as 
well as compromise in some stalled areas of the agriculture negotiations.  The report 
concluded before the failed in 2006 and 2008.  Updating the report in the same format 
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will be useful to assess how Beijing changed, in an attempt to answer if Beijing continues 
agricultural liberalization or if it is retreating towards protectionism. 
In Roots of Competitiveness, the authors posed two major questions while 
conducting a complete review of China’s progress in WTO commitments in agriculture:  
Will China continue to negotiate further agriculture reform? And, at what pace will 
domestic agriculture reform continue—or will it digress?33  They listed their key points at 
the beginning of the report and made a series of assessments on the strategy China 
needed to pursue to ensure success in agriculture.  They found that China’s best interests 
were in continued liberalization in all areas of WTO agricultural negotiations and that 
China was more open with regard to agricultural trade than most other countries.  With 
formal education and experience, Chinese leadership had become better informed about 
agricultural policy and that Chinese agriculture was in the process of transforming from 
land to labor intensive crops.  Additionally, China had not negatively impacted world 
agricultural trade upon joining the WTO and that China’s concerns evolved from 
domestic reform to market access issues.   
Additionally, the authors found that China appeared to be pursuing trade 
liberalization more aggressively than its developing nation counterparts and that China 
could address the domestic negative effects of change within the confines  of its WTO 
agreement.  Food security arguments remained in the background while China remained 
a net food exporter and China’s continued growth in the industrial and service sector 
would reduce peasant reliance on the agriculture sector for survival.  There were few 
trade disputes compared to the large volume of Chinese trade.  Finally, they assessed that 
because China was more liberalized than other nations, stalemates or negotiated 
agreements with small reductions in subsidies and market access would hurt Chinese 
interests.  A fully liberalized trading regime internationally would benefit Chinese 
agricultural interests more.34   
                                                 
33 Daniel Rosen, Scott Rozelle, and Jikun Huang, Roots of Competitiveness: China’s Evolving 
Agriculture Interests (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2004), 2. 
34 Rosen et al., 2-3. 
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Rosen et al. concluded that any collapse in negotiations and China’s departure 
from the negotiations table would only hurt its interests.  Having made these points, the 
report moved into examining China and its WTO agreements. The analysis did not 
consider options for China if, after four more years, there were only limited results with 
no agreement and developed countries continued to show reluctance to further open their 
markets as China had already accomplished. 
Their final section provided recommendations and conclusions, though they did 
not discuss strategies Beijing could implement if negotiations stalled or collapsed.  They 
also do not discuss how limited progress in the talks could affect China’s reforms.  The 
author’s format for evaluation, market indicators, negotiation trends and estimates 
provided a good framework with which to answer this question: Can agricultural trade 
data and Beijing’s stances in agricultural negotiations since 2004 reveal if it continues 
agricultural liberalization or is retreating towards protectionism? 
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III. CHINESE DOMESTIC MARKET LIBERALIZATION 
In their study entitled Roots of Competitiveness, Rosen et al. asked the question: 
“Is China’s recent penchant for proliberalization talk on agriculture going to last?”35  To 
answer this question the authors reviewed China’s path to liberalization through 2004 and 
decided that it would continue.  Their main data points included the sweeping reforms the 
CCP implemented, and the effects these reforms have had on the citizens (especially the 
poor).  They then used the traditional economic argument of comparative advantage—
that China would continue to profit from a transfer from land to labor intensive farm 
products.  They examined WTO commitments made during accession talks and evaluated 
China’s progress in meeting them as well as the effect various areas of change would 
potentially have on China and the world trade system.  Their main purpose in doing so 
was to “suggest whether [agriculture trade liberalization] will stay the current course, go 
faster, slower, or even backward?”36  In their findings they concluded liberalization 
would continue for China and not retreat towards protection. 
Would these findings hold true through 2008, when little else had changed 
regarding agriculture negotiations even while China continued to reform?  From 2004-
2008, China endured two Trade Policy Reviews, watched trade talks fail at the height of 
world food and fuel prices, then experience the collapse of the financial market.  Amidst 
this storm, would China continue to liberalize trade and agriculture?  Examining the same 
issues Rosen et al. evaluated will likely provide a preliminary answer to that question. 
Multiple issues were discussed by Rosen et al., with the authors breaking the 
issues down into the three trade pillars and other trade issues areas.  To update the report 
and provide a preliminary answer to the questions, it will be useful to first divide their 
issues into two main areas.  Domestic issues will be examined in this chapter.  The 
following chapter will examine the international negotiations.   
                                                 
35 Rosen et al.,  2. 
36 Rosen et al., 2. 
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It is useful to separate the issues into these two groups.  With stalled negotiations 
over the last four years, it is highly likely that the negotiations stances have not changed 
much, but domestic area specific issues could.  The more domestic issues can also be 
used to determine whether China continues to liberalize or is becoming more 
protectionist, no matter how negotiations fare. Changes in these domestic indicators are 
often the result of prior negotiations, so it is assumed that these indicators will continue 
towards reform, even if subsequent negotiations stalled or failed.  If a government 
decided to intervene because of a current issue, this intervention could reveal itself 
through slowed, stalled, or reversed progress. 
The mandate from the November 2001 Ministerial Declaration in Doha, Qatar 
(the Doha Mandate), declared that the member states “commit ourselves to 
comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in market access; 
reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial 
reductions in trade distorting domestic support.”37  From this phrase, negotiators have 
broken most trade issues down into these three areas, referred to as the three pillars of the 
WTO agricultural negotiations: Market Access, Export Subsidies, and Domestic 
Supports. 
Specific to China, Rosen et al. worked with a series of domestic indicators studied 
through 2004.  Under the market access pillar they provided the tariff rates in Table 1 for 
11 products and the quotas for another seven products in Table 2.  Sugar, rice, and maize 
(feed corn) were ones that China should open more fully to the market and, in the case of 
sugar, should halt all protections on it.  Within the export subsidies pillar, the authors 
highlighted Beijing’s statement to decrease and subsequently eliminate corn subsidies.  In 
domestic supports, Rosen et al. measured the Chinese AMS rate at less than 4%, well 
under the allowed rate.  Outside the three pillars, the authors noted the change in arable 
land use toward more labor-intensive crops and a decrease in the food security rhetoric 
amongst policy makers.  They also noted a decrease in state control of the grain trade and 
that fertilizer was fully privatized.  Would the trend of change in these areas continue? 
                                                 
37 Doha Ministerial Declaration, November 2001, Paragraph 13. 
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A. MARKET ACCESS 
The first pillar of the Doha Mandate demands the reduction of tariffs and the 
establishment of tariffs rate quotas (TRQ) to open up domestic markets to foreign 
competition with the ultimate goal of eliminating all tariffs and TRQ.  The Doha Mandate 
emerged from the Uruguay round of talks where the formula for tariff reduction could not 
be agreed upon.  The Uruguay formula applied an average to all tariffs and various 
members declared that this would allow already low tariffs to be raised because unusually 
high tariff rates of some products distorted the calculations.  The Uruguay proposal also 
left various loopholes that did not please all members.  The Doha talks which followed 
the Uruguay Round stalled over discussions concerning modalities (the equation) that 
was to be used to determine tariff reductions over time.  This modality stalemate 
continues. 
China’s position with regard to market access had a history going back to the 
Deng reforms of 1979.  Prior to opening, China’s command economy pricing structure 
operated within a twice protected system of currency controls and fixed state pricing 
controlled by twelve national foreign trading companies.  The two systems allowed the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to buy and sell world commodities at world prices and 
then convert them to domestic prices.  This allowed the CCP to buy goods on the 
international market that it could not produce itself or when there were shortages in 
domestic production.  It also allowed the CCP to sell goods on the international market at 
whatever price deemed necessary to move the goods.  Approaching reform, the CCP first 
set up special economic zones, devalued its currency, and broke the state controlled 
monopoly on international trade to better open up this two tiered system.38   
When China opened its economy, Beijing enacted tariffs to protect its economy 
from the sudden shock of the international market.  In 1992, five years after application 
to rejoin GATT, the World Bank reported China’s tariffs equaled Brazil’s, with a trade 
weighed mean tariff at 32% and an unweighted tariff at 43%.  The report also found 
                                                 
38 Naughton, 380-383. 
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significant non-tariff barriers (NTB) in place that distorted prices.39  China continued to 
convert these NTB to tariffs to aid in negotiations to enter the GATT and by 1999 had 
lowered its unweighted mean tariff to 17%.40   
1. Tariffs through 2004 
Pre-WTO market change had been good for China and Beijing probably hoped for 
continued success.  Primary goods trade grew from $16.1 billion in 1980 to $72.1 billion 
in 2001 (a 7.4% growth rate) and agricultural GDP rose 4.6% annually.41  Reform was 
clearly benefiting both domestic farmer and world buyer alike.  After joining the WTO, 
Beijing continued to drive reforms to increase market access in agriculture.  China 
continued to drop its allowed agriculture tariffs: from 21% in 1999 to 15.2% at the end of 
the study.  Rosen et al. also found that while the allowed rates were low, “the real applied 
rates are much lower than the bound rates: 7.6% pre-accession, headed toward 3.6% post-
accession”.42  The WTO agreement merely continued the reform.  Rosen et al. focused on 
eleven products listed below in Table 1.  These products remain major agriculture 
imports for China and higher tariffs act as a way to generate income and protect domestic 
production.  
 
                                                 
39 Naughton, 385. 
40 Naughton, 391. 
41 Rosen et al., 23. 
42 Rosen et al., 8. 
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Crop Tariff, 2004  Crop Tariff, 2004 
Barley 3%  Beef 12% 
Soybeans 3%  Pork 12% 
Citrus 12%  Poultry Meat 10% 
Other fruits 10-13%  Dairy Products 10-12% 
Vegetables 10-15%  Wine/Tobacco 14% / 10% 
Table 1.   2004 Tariff Rates on Major Agriculture Imports43 
 
2. Tariffs Changes from 2004-2008 
The rapid market access in some areas of Chinese production was attributed 
directly to the reduction in tariffs.  An across the board increase in tariffs could indicate a 
change in policy, and possibly violate the WTO agreement.  But such changes did not 
occur.  China attained a final bound rate of 15.3% for WTO agriculture products in 2005, 
five years ahead of schedule, and its applied rate for agriculture remained just under 
15.3% in 2007.44  All 11 products from Table 1 were already at the agreed bound rate or 
lower and did not change further.45   
Static tariff rates did not mean that Beijing had reduced its commitment to market 
liberalization.  Beijing chose to leave the tariffs at their bound rate, exactly as agreed.  
Also, Beijing did not raise these 11 products tariff rates during the various crises that 
occurred after 2004.  Achieving the committed tariff goal early actually shows how 
committed China is to the WTO agreement and its tenets of open trade.   
                                                 
43 Rosen et al., 42.  In the report the source listed under the table was labeled as “China’s WTO 
Protocol of Accession, November 2001.” 
44 World Trade Organization (WTO), “Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat—CHINA 
Revision,”  World Trade Organization, document WT/TPR/S/199/Rev.1, 12 August 2008, 49. 
45 European Commission, “WTO Accession China Tariff Schedule,” September 2003.  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/september/tradoc_113817.pdf (accessed February 2008). 
 26
3. TRQ through 2004 
The TRQ process was added into China’s WTO application to allow foreign 
market access to products with high final bound rates.  The formal system was 
implemented in negotiations between Beijing and Washington during accession talks and 
the structure has since been considered as an accession mechanism for other non-market 
economies.  The out-tariff rate for seven Chinese agriculture products was set at the final 
bound rate while allowing various amounts of foreign products into the domestic market 
at lower rates.  In some cases, there was an implementation timeline to allow much 
higher tariff rates to be slowly adjusted to the final bound rate while in others, the goal 
was to slowly bring the out-tariff rate in line with the lower in-tariff rate; all while 
meeting an  average tariff goal of 15%.  For instance, edible oil tariffs started well above 
the 60% out-tariff rates.  These high rates were gradually brought down to the WTO 
agreed rate of 9% for all edible cooking oils imported into China. 
It is important to note that the products listed below in Table 2 fell into Beijing’s 
category of national strategic products and Beijing was allowed to control access to these 
markets.  The authors took exception to the inclusion of sugar.  They found that sugar 
was not a strategic product for China and that China would benefit from greater access to 
world markets; Chinese protection of sugar did not make sense when considering 
comparative advantage.46  Continued protection in sugar or an increased protection in 








                                                 
46 Rosen et al., 49. 
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Farm Product Import Quota 





Rice 5.32 1% 65% 
Wheat 9.64 1% 65% 
Maize (Corn) 7.20 1% 65% 
Cotton .89 1% 40% 
Wool .37 1% 38% 
Edible Oils 6.81 9% 68% 
Sugar 1.95 20% 50% 
Table 2.   2004 TRQ on Chinese Farm Products47 
 
4. TRQ Changes from 2004-2008 
Beijing can lower the out-tariff rate and in-tariff rate and/or increase the import 
quota amount all without being in breach of any WTO agreement—making imports 
coming into the country cheaper.  While not expected to occur, such a change would 
show continued liberalization and further opening of markets.  Also, not eliminating or 
delaying the phase out of a TRQ would also indicate a change in policy violating the 
WTO agreement. 
Some change was noted in the early years of implementation when all cotton 
imports above the quota were still charged in-tariff rates.  From 2004-2008, there was no 
change to the amount or tariff rates for any of the seven products from Table 2, and there 
were no reported instances of decreased out-tariff rates.  This can likely be attributed to 
the fact that China had reached far toward market reform and that it does not need to go 
farther.  It is important to remember that the TRQ was a market access tool, not a 
                                                 
47 Rosen et al., 43.  In the report the source listed under the table was labeled as “China’s WTO 
Protocol of Accession, November 2001; NBS, China Statistical Yearbook, 2001.” 
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commitment from China to import those amounts of materials from foreign sources—a 
point that had to be reinforced with various members during the trade reviews China 
endured. 
Since 2006, China’s Agriculture Ministers have argued against further domestic 
exposure to foreign imports in the seven products.  From the USDA: 
China’s Ministry of Agriculture argues strongly that the WTO concessions 
made as part of accession are partially responsible for the farm sector’s 
increased exposure to imported commodities, in particular soybeans and 
cotton.  As a result, officials state that any further agricultural 
liberalization including tariff cuts, relaxation of tariff rate quota (TRQ), or 
elimination of import licensing is off the table.48  
The Agriculture Ministry statement is reflected in the static behavior of all product tariffs 
and quota quantities since edible oils attained the agreed accession amount of 9%.  There 
have been some problems noted with the state’s procedure for filling quotas or 
reallocating quotas that were under-used.  While China has provided answers to the 
system of allocation for the quotas, it also pointed out that the world price and domestic 
price limit the import of certain products at certain times.49  Ministerial statements 
indicate continued change is unlikely so additional research in this area will have to focus 
on the TRQ system of allocation itself and its institutions and state trade participation, not 







                                                 
48 USDA, “Agricultural Economy and Policy Report—China,” 3 February 2009.  
www.fas.usda.gov/country/China/china%20agricultural%20economy%20and%20policy%20report.pdf. 
(accessed February 2009) .  Previous versions of the report back to 2006 carry similar statements. 
49 WTO, Trade Policy Review: China. Minutes of Meeting Addendum, WTO Document # 
WT/TPR/M/199/Add.1, 28 August 2008; WTO, Summary report of the meeting held on 18 November 
2004, WTO Document # G/AG/R/41, 17 February 2005, 11. 
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 Import Quota (Million Metric Tons) In-Tariff Rate (%) Out -Tariff Rate (%) 
Year  ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 '07 ‘08 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 
Rice 5.32 5.32  5.32  5.32  5.32 1 1 1 1 1 65 65  65  65  65 
Wheat 9.64 9. 64 9. 64 9. 64 9. 64 1 1 1 1 1 65 65 65 65 65 
Maize 
(Corn) 
7.20 7.20 7.2 7. 2 7. 2 1 1 1 1 1 65 65 65 65 65 
Cotton .89 . 89 . 89 . 89 . 89 1 1 1 1 1 40 40 40 40 40 
Wool .29 . 29 . 29 . 29 . 29 1 1 1 1 1 38 38 38 38 38 
Edible 
Oils 
8.00 8.00 None None None 9 9 - - - 30.7 19.9 - - - 
Sugar 1.95 1. 95 1. 95 1. 95 1. 95 15 15 15 15 15 50 50 50 50 50 
Table 3.   China’s Market Access Commitments on Farm Products Subject to TRQ50 
 
5. Sugar, Rice, and Corn Findings through 2004 
Rosen et al. presented that the sugar, rice, and corn markets all could open further 
to foreign markets to the betterment of domestic China either by making commodity 
prices lower or by allowing farmers to switch to other more advantageous markets.  In the 
sugar industry, where 95% of China sugar production is centered in the most 
economically depressed rural areas of China (Guangxi, Yunnan, Hainan, Xinjiang), 
                                                 
50 2004: Rosen et al., 43. Source listed under the table was labeled as “China’s WTO Protocol of 
Accession, November 2001; NBS, China Statistical Yearbook, 2001”.  Updates include: 
Wool quota was changed according to the findings from the 2008 Trade Policy Review - WTO, TPR 
(2008).  It was originally reported as .37 MMT. 
Rape seed oil has been added to the number provided in the Rosen report.  The tariff rates were 
unaffected by the addition of rape seed oil.  Also, the out-tariff rate was originally reported as 68% for 
2004.  It has been updated as well from the TPR.  The TRQ was phased out in 2005 as agreed with a final 
bound tariff rate at 9% with no quotas. 
Sugar rate was changed according to the findings from the 2008 Trade Policy Review - WTO, TPR 
(2008).  It was originally reported as 20%.  
2005/6: World Trade Organization (WTO), “Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat—CHINA 
Revision.”  World Trade Organization, document WT/TPR/S/199/Rev.1, 12 August 2008, 226-227.  
2007/8: Assessed based on trade minister statement that the TRQ system would not change further. 
WTO, “Summary Report of the Meeting Held on 28 March 2007,” WTO Document # G/AG/R/48, 6 July 
2007, 15.  Cotton and Sugar rates for 2007/8 verified the minister statement. WTO, TPR (2008), 129; 
USDA, “Sugar: World Production Supply and Distribution,” November 2008, 
www.fas.usda.gov/htp/sugar/2008/Nov%20sugar%202008.pdf (accessed March 2009).        
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moving away from sugar to other more profitable crops such as vegetables would raise 
standards of living.  However, there is hesitance to change in these areas for failure to 
transition would result in even worse living conditions for sugar cane / beet growing 
farmers.  The argument to allow more rice into the country rests strongly on the idea of 
urban price decreases on a staple food which would raise the quality of life inside the 
city.  Finally, opening the corn market to foreign crops would allow China to better use 
its comparative advantage in labor by getting away from producing a land intensive 
product like corn. 
6. Sugar, Rice, and Corn Findings from 2004-2008 
With no change in tariff rates or TRQ amounts, one valuable way to measure 
changes in market access is to look at the amount of land under production; the 
assumption is that as more of a product is available from external sources, domestic 
production should not increase and farmland use for that commodity decrease.  In 2004, 
Chinese farmers planted and harvested 1.4 million hectares of sugar cane (Guangxi alone 
planted over .67 million hectares) and .34 million hectares of sugar beets.  USDA 
estimated in 2004, that while cane field areas remained about the same, sugar beet areas 
had actually decreased due to farmers growing more profitable crops such as soybeans 
and tomatoes.51  For the 2008/9 growing season, USDA estimated farmers planted 1.6 
million hectares of sugar cane (Guangxi province accounted for most of the increase with 
.88 million hectares in production) while the sugar beet area declined—USDA forecasted 
planted area at .315 million hectares—even as local sugar mills raised their purchase 
price for beets.  This change in pricing probably contributed to the 5% annual increase of 
planted area, though the overall number was still lower than its 2004 counterpart.52  
Overall sugar production decreased only slightly, with increased yields from the 
expanded cane areas covering the losses experienced in sugar beets. 
                                                 
51 USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, “China, People’s Republic of. Sugar Annual 2004,” GAIN 
Report, Num. CH4009, 10 April  2004,  3,8.  http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200404/146105994.pdf 
(accessed February 2009). 
52 USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, “Sugar: World Production Supply and Distribution,” November 
2008.  http://www.fas.usda.gov/htp/sugar/2008/Nov%20sugar%202008.pdf (accessed February 2009). 
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Rice and corn also experienced land changes.  USDA reported China’s rice 
paddies covered 26.5 million hectares for the 2003/4 growing season.53  The USDA 
projected areas under rice cultivation for the 2008/9 growing season are estimated at 29 
million hectares with a projected yield increase per hectare of 6% since 2003.54  With no 
change in the in-quota TRQ amount, China’s domestic production probably expanded to 
meet the growing demand in China generated by the increase in wealth and continued 
population growth.  A similar result was expected for corn even though it is land 
intensive and does not take advantage of the preponderance of labor that exists in China.  
USDA reported 24.1 million hectares of corn were planted for the 2003/4 growing 
season, and increased to 29.2 million hectares under cultivation for 2008/9.55 
When considering land use for sugar, rice, and corn, it appears China has not 
further liberalized under the market access pillar.  From 2004-2006, with the exception of 
cotton, China never im ported m ore than th e in-tariff am ount for any TRQ produc t.56  
Even when switching to oversea s suppliers and encouraging sugar producers to switch 
commodities would aid  Beijing in  its fight to com bat rural poverty, sugar rem ained 
insulated.  Rice and corn also showed similar results.  Land use study remains a vital tool 
in evaluating market liberalization changes.  
B. EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
Export subsidies are the quickest and most direct way to encourage traders to 
export and distort world trade.  These subsidies lower the overall cost of production 
artificially and provide the incentive to export at the artificially lowered price.  Export 
                                                 
53 USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, “World Agriculture Production,” WAP 12-04, December 2004. 
Table 9. http://www.fas.usda.gov/wap/circular/2004/04-12/Wap%2012-04.pdf (accessed February 2009). 
54 USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, “World Agriculture Production,” WAP 12-08, December 2008. 
Table 9. http://www.fas.usda.gov/wap/circular/2008/08-12/productionfull12-08.pdf (accessed February 
2009). 
55 USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, “World Agriculture Production,” WAP 12-04, December 2004. 
Table 4. http://www.fas.usda.gov/wap/circular/2004/04-12/Wap%2012-04.pdf (accessed February 2009);  
USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, “World Agriculture Production,” WAP 12-08, December 2008. 
Table 4. http://www.fas.usda.gov/wap/circular/2008/08-12/productionfull12-08.pdf  (accessed February 
2009). 
56 World Trade Organization (WTO), “Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat—CHINA 
Revision.”  World Trade Organization, document WT/TPR/S/199/Rev.1, 12 August 2008, 226-227. 
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subsidies adversely affect the selling price of developing countries’ farmers, lowering 
their wage.  As most of these farmers are also in the poorest sectors of society, export 
subsidies are blamed on hurting the initiatives to raise more people out of poverty.  For 
development reasons then, export subsidies are generally banned. 
Only 25 WTO members have clauses that allow for export subsidies—Australia, 
Canada, European Union, and the United States are key agriculture exporters with such 
protections.  China, for accession agreed to eliminate all forms of export subsidies and 
since joining the WTO has worked to meet that agreement.  The authors found evidence 
of export subsidies continuing through the first two years of membership but do note that 
in 2004, Beijing announced that export subsidies were being eliminated.57  Unlike the 
import tariff pillar, where there exists some room to increase protections without 
violating WTO agreements, the export subsidies pillar has no such allowance.  Chinese 
export subsidies would have violated the WTO agreement. 
Rosen et al. noted Beijing’s commitment to eliminate all export subsidies.  They 
indicated only corn remained subsidized.  Ministers stated that export subsidies for corn 
would be eliminated and the 2008 Trade Policy Review also referenced China’s 
continued commitment to the elimination of all export subsidies.58  Corn should not be 
exported given China’s disadvantage at producing it: low-mechanized farm plots 
typically under an acre, and the high water and fertilizer input requirements.  These 
factors should make corn export unprofitable, especially following the elimination of any 
sort of subsidy.  USDA World Agriculture Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) 





                                                 
57 Rosen et al., 39. 
58 WTO, TPR (2008), 114. 
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Corn Crop Year Import                  
(Million Metric Tons) 
Export (MMT) WASDE Report #           
(Date of Report) 
2001/02 0.04 8.61 406-20 (Jan. 2004) 
2002/03 0.03 15.24 417-20 (Dec. 2004) 
2003/04 0.00 7.55 430-20 (Jan. 2006) 
2004/05 0.00 7.59 441-22 (Dec. 2006) 
2005/06 0.06 3.73 453-22 (Dec. 2007) 
2006/07 0.02 5.27 467-22 (Feb. 2009) 
2007/08 Estimated 0.04 0.55 467-22 (Feb. 2009) 
2008/09 Projected 0.10 0.50 467-22 (Feb. 2009) 
Table 4.   China Corn Imports and Exports, 2001-200959 
 
The dramatic decrease in corn exports from the 2008 estimate and 2009 projection 
likely indicate that export subsidies for corn have been removed and it is no longer 
profitable to export it.  Imports remain low and this likely accounts for the expansion of 
domestic acreage as mentioned above.  More corn fields with higher yields combined 
with the elimination of exports seem to be enough to cover China’s current demand for 
corn.  As mentioned above though, at a point in the future, China farmers should stop 
expanding corn production and focus on more advantageous crops.  At that time, China’s 
corn import numbers should increase.  The export data does indicate export subsidies in 
corn have been eliminated as declared. 
Corn was the only product that Rosen et al. noted having export subsidies and the 
only product examined.  The Trade Policy Review for 2008 also found no current export 
subsidies.  With no export subsidies in this pillar, China is one of the most liberal trade 
nations in the world. 
                                                 
59 The most current WASDE report is maintained on the USDA website at 
http://www.usda.gov/oce/commodity/wasde/latest.pdf ; the archive for all WASDE reports is maintained by 
Cornell University’s Albert R. Mann Library http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu.  
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C. DOMESTIC SUPPORTS 
The most difficult trade pillar to measure is the one dealing with domestic 
supports.  Government support that could potentially distort trade and affect prices not 
already placed into one of the other pillars fall into this area of negotiations.  The WTO 
devised a grouping mechanism of colored boxes to further break this cumbersome pillar 
into four workable areas.  The Amber Box deals with supports that directly distort prices 
or are tied to production amounts.60   Blue Box supports include those supports that 
normally would fall into the Amber Box but place limits on production — basically 
incentives not to produce — and is primarily used by wealthy developed countries.61  The 
Green Box includes government-funded incentives that do not distort trade and whose 
funds do not originate from increased prices.62  The final box is the Special and 
Differential (S&D) Box which contains individual developing country exemptions.63 
To further complicate the third pillar, calculations and governance depend on 
government transparency and self-reporting.  How a member’s domestic support program 
is classified is important because all supports that fall into the Amber Box are totaled, 
which generates the “aggregate measure of support” (AMS) figure.  AMS can only be a 
certain percentage of the gross value of domestic agriculture production.  Going above 
the AMS percentage violates the WTO agreement; developed nations’ AMS is set at 5%; 
developing nations AMS is set at 10%.64 
1. China’s AMS Rate before 2004 
China agreed to an AMS at 8.5%, even though it was allowed 10% at accession.  
At accession, China’s AMS amount was roughly calculated between 2.0-3.5%;65  the 
                                                 
60 Article 6 of the Agriculture Agreement fully defines Amber Box supports. 
61 Article 6, Paragraph 5 of the Agriculture Agreement fully defines Blue Box supports. 
62 Annex 2 of the Agriculture Agreement fully defines Green Box supports. 
63 No formal definition as the issue is member dependent. 
64 Complete background on agriculture domestic supports and the colored box explanations can be 
found on the WTO Agriculture site: WTO, “Fact sheet: Explaining “the boxes” in Domestic Support,” 
2002. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm. (accessed March 2009).                       
65 Rosen et al., 13. 
 35
8.5% upper limit provided Beijing with much room to grow without violating WTO 
agreements.  The authors noted that Beijing had embarked upon schemes at the provincial 
level to lessen the impact joining the WTO had on farmers.  They speculated that the 
pilot program, if applied across China would not violate the AMS level and “be more 
than sufficient to offset most if not all the adverse effects of China’s WTO accession 
agreement.”66  Since this pilot program paid the farmer directly and was not tied to 
production or supported by increased prices it would be classified in the Green Box of 
domestic support and not count against China’s AMS calculation amount. 
2. Estimating China’s AMS Rate from 2004-2008 
Accurately calculating China’s Domestic Support amounts required government 
transparency and correct self-reports.  In 2006, China provided data to help answer what 
its AMS amount was, but that data was only for 1999-2001.  Since that time is had been 
through two Trade Policy Reviews and at each it has been unable to provide additional 
data.  The 2008 TPR stated, “according to [Chinese] authorities, this is due to technical 
issues regarding the existing Chinese data.”67  When asked to provide further 
information, Beijing responded, “[t]he domestic support notifications for 2002 onwards 
are under preparation.”68  Since no consolidated reporting then exists from Chinese 
authorities, anecdotal evidence and partial reporting have to be used to see if China’s 
AMS rate is increasing or decreasing from the 3.5% estimate. 
One of the first clues that domestic supports will increase is found in Beijing’s 
economic and social development plan released after the First Session of the Eleventh 
National People’s Congress in March 2008.  Section III, sub-section 2, paragraph 3 of the 
English version stated: 
The policy of agricultural subsidies will be strengthened and improved.  
We will continue to provide assistance directly to grain farmers and raise 
the overall level of general direct subsidies for agricultural supplies in 
                                                 
66 Rosen et al., 53. 
67 WTO, TPR (2008), 115. 
68 World Trade Organization (WTO), “Trade Policy Review: China. Minutes of Meeting Addendum,”  
World Trade Organization, document WT/TPR/M/199/Add.1, 28 August 2008, 291. 
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response to price rises, expand the scale of subsidies for growing 
improved crop varieties and the scope of eligibility for subsidies for 
purchasing agricultural machinery and tools, and appropriately raise 
minimum grain purchase prices.  Trials of subsidized agricultural 
insurance premiums will be expanded.69  
The level of that increase remained to be seen.  After 2004, China also moved away from 
taxing farmers and after implementing a national income tax, Article 86 of the China’s 
Enterprise Income Tax granted exemptions to agriculture producers and pork growers.70   
Some agriculture support data does exist to support the social development plan 
statement.  Agriculture expenditures were listed at Yuan 123 billion in 2000, increased to 
Yuan 236 billion in 2004, and increased again to Yuan 317 billion in 2006.  Within these 
spending figures were direct subsidies to grain growers.  In 2004, direct subsidy was 
listed as Yuan 11.6 billion which increased to Yuan 14.2 billion in 2006.  An additional 
Yuan 12 billion subsidy was granted to grain producers for price increases in production 
inputs in 2006.71  In 2007, total agriculture spending was reported at Yuan 432.7 billion 
and increased again in 2008 to Yuan 562.5 billion with an additional Yuan 25.3 billion in 
reported supports for farmers.72  The current world fiscal crisis and trade imbalance 
likely will inhibit budget increases in agriculture, though anecdotal evidence does point 
to near term actions to protect Chinese farmers during the most recent round of price 
fluctuations and weather and do fall into the domestic support category.73 
                                                 
69 National People’s Congress, “Report on the Implementation of the 2007 Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development and on the 2008 Draft Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development,” 5 March 2008.  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/20/content_7827893.htm 
(accessed February 2009). 
70 U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission, “2008 Report to Congress,”  
http://www.uscc.gov, page 38. (accessed December 2008). 
71 WTO, TPR (2006), 174; WTO, TPR (2008), 116. 
72 Xinhua News Agency, “Pledge not to Stop Rice Exports Lauded,” Xinhua, 25 April 2008. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/25/content_8047076.htm (accessed February 2009). 
Xinhua News Agency, “Chinese Grain Reserves Sufficient,” Xinhua, 5 May 2008. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/05/content_8106686.htm (accessed February 2009). 
73 Beijing allocated the equivalent of $80.1 billion for its 2008 agriculture budget.  The United States 
in 2004 spent $95 billion in domestic agriculture support where a significantly lower percent of the 
population was engaged in farming.  These amounts increased in the 2008 U.S. Farm Bill.  The developing 
world claims the U.S. and even higher EU farm supports distorted trade.  These amounts would be a 
significant contention point in 2008 and contribute to the collapse of the latest Doha round of talks.   
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China announced various farm subsidies to aid in the severe winter weather in 
early 2008, the summer 2008 collapse of commodity prices, and aid for farmers affected 
by severe weather in 2009.  In February 2008, the Ministry of Finance allocated Yuan 
63.3 billion for agriculture goods and grain subsidies to hard hit areas in the central, 
south, and southwest provinces.74  Following the collapse of farm prices in the summer 
of 2008, the Chinese government purchased 10 million metric tons of corn to stabilize 
prices and provide direct supports to Chinese farmers at a cost of Yuan 15 billion.  This 
report was discussed by the USDA in its World Agriculture Production series when it 
stated, “the [Chinese] government plans to purchase 10 million tons of corn, mainly from 
the Northeast, to support the corn market and improve farmers’ income.”75  In February 
2009, in response to the ongoing drought in China’s wheat and rape seed producing areas, 
an additional Yuan 400 million was being sent in to provide relief assistance.76  The 
anecdotal evidence does indicate China continues to subsidize its farmers; though how 
those subsidies are to be classified in the AMS scheme is entirely dependent on how the 
regional governments allocate that money to be spent.  Additional responses to continued 
disasters, the financial crisis, and government purchases and sales will likely complicate 
China calculation of domestic supports and continue to delay any AMS reporting to the 
Trade Policy Review body of the WTO. 
Having not released numbers to the WTO is a mark against Chinese market 
liberalization.  The Rosen et al. estimate of 2.0-3.5% was based on the 1999-2001 trade 
data provided.  At the time the agriculture budget in 2000 was Yuan 123 billion.  Since 
then the budget has increased dramatically to Yuan 562.5 billion in 2008.  A 450% 
increase in the budget will probably have a direct effect on the amount of money put into 
AMS related supports.  If that is the case, a high estimated AMS rate could be between 
9.1-16.0%, well above the 8.5% limit Beijing placed on itself at accession. 
                                                 
74 Xinhua News Agency, “Direct Farm Subsidies to Help Post-Disaster Reconstruction,” Xinhua, 22 
February 2008. http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/243567.htm (accessed February 2009). 
75 USDA, WAP 12-08, 3. 
76 BBC News, “China Declares Drought Emergency,” BBC ONLINE, 2 February 2009.  
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D. OTHER TRADE DISTORTIONS 
Outside market access, export subsidies, and domestic supports the authors noted 
other market liberalization trends.  They noted changes in arable land use toward more 
labor intensive crops and a decrease in the food security rhetoric amongst policy makers.  
State control of the grain trade decreased and the fertilizer trade was fully privatized.  
Would these trends continue? 
1. Arable Land Use through 2004 Considering Comparative Advantage 
One of the basic assumptions of comparative advantage and the free market is that 
a farmer will grow a crop in which it has favorable factors of production.  In China’s 
case, the producer is faced with a large labor pool and limited available arable land.  
Under this circumstance, to make the most profit, products that are land intensive should 
give way to those that are labor intensive.  It is then easy to assume that arable land use 
would show those trends as labor intensive products begin to replace land intensive ones 
on the available land.  The authors noted Chinese farmers, after given the choice of what 
to farm, shifted to crops that they could produce competitively.  Meats, fruits, and 
vegetables replaced the state demanded grain crops and planted areas for these crops 
increased to the point where the authors calculated China “added a “new California” 
every two or three years in China between 1990 and 2002.”77  Forcing farmers to plow 
under these income generating plots and return to a more state controlled system of grain 
products would be an unmistakable sign of a reversal of reforms and a return to 
protectionism. 
2. Arable Land Use: Growth in All Areas, 2004-2008 
Since 2004, there has been an increase in land dedicated to high labor crops.  But 
China has not only expanded production in labor-intensive commodities, it has also 
maintained or expanded production in land-intensive crops.  There are no real land losers, 
as seen in Table 5.  Corn and wheat both continued to expand.  Total land use numbers 
expanded while Chinese farmers also increased the production of meat and milk: 110 
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million tons in 2006, up from 70 million in 2000.78  Domestic supports have likely led to 
some land use distortions but the numbers do not seem to match up with the reports of 
farmland loss to commercial endeavors, real estate, or desertification.  In 2007, the State 
Council announced suspension of a 1.3 million hectares reforestation scheme to protect 
fragile farmlands on hillsides because of its pledge to maintain a minimum of 120 million 
hectares of farmland.  The report mentioned that China had only 122.07 million hectares 
of agriculture land in production and could not afford to set aside the million hectares for 
trees.79  Consider the following land use numbers below in Table 5: 
Product 2000 2002/3 2004 2008/9 
Cotton  4.18  6.0 
Wheat  23.9  24.0 
Corn  24.6  29.2 
Other Course Grains  3.4  2.86 
Rice  28.2  29.0 
Soybeans  8.72  9.30 
Other Oil Seeds  17.38  17.25 
Fruits / Vegetables 22.36 23.5 (est.) 24.97 30.0 (est.) 
Total Land Area  133.88 (est.)  147.61 (est.) 
Table 5.   Arable Land under Cultivation (Million Hectares)80 
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There are many explanations for the wide disparity in numbers. One reason could 
be found in the Chinese bureaucracy and the unintended consequence of changing from a 
taxation system to a support system.  Provinces likely under reported taxable agricultural 
lands to the central government in order to maintain some revenues outside the control of 
Beijing.  In 2006, with the elimination of the farm tax and the provision of farm 
subsidies, it stands to reason that there will be some fraud as farmers and local officials 
try to collect more government support money by inflating land holdings.  It is an area 
that requires further study to determine better land use numbers.   
The data as presented in Table 5 does seem to indicate that while the government 
allows the expansion of various cash crops, Beijing continues to hedge and finance a 
domestic production capability for grain even if it is against its free market interests.  
While not a retreat into protectionism, it does appear, from the view of arable land, that 
China continues to liberalize with some domestic safeguards to meet political and social 
concerns.   
3. The Decrease in Food Security Rhetoric through 2004 
Rosen et al. noted a lack of rhetoric that would indicate Beijing desired to return 
to a protectionist style, command / planned economy from accession talks through 2004.  
There were expectations in Beijing that agriculture reform would occur simultaneously 
with rural poverty reduction—where reform had to support that key endeavor.  They 
attributed this lack of rhetoric to China’s position as a world trader.  “Food security, an 
overarching noneconomic concern that trumps rational arguments about agriculture 
reform in many countries, is less critical as long as China remains a net food exporter 
with high productivity growth.”81   
                                                                                                                                                 
2000/4 Fruits / Vegetables: Sophia Huang and Fred Gale, “China’s Rising Fruit and Vegetable Exports 
Challenge U.S. Industries,” USDA, FTS-320-01, February 2006. Table 3. 
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increase to production efficiency and the other 50% to land expansion. 
81 Rosen et al., 3. 
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4. Protectionist Rhetoric Rise after 2004 
After 2004, trade data indicated China had finally become a net food importer.  If 
Rosen et al. were correct, then an increase in rhetoric is to be expected.  While leaders 
could tolerate import reliance during times of plenty and market stability, what about in 
times of crisis?  Evaluating national policy documents, leadership speeches, and 
bureaucrat statements made during the food crisis between November 2007 and August 
2008, when protectionist tendencies and food security issues were evident world wide 
revealed the authors’ prediction was correct. 
The NPC 2008 Draft Plan for National Economic and Social Development was 
the most influential policy planning document released during the food crisis that 
combined economic concerns and social well-being.   
We have enjoyed years of bumper harvests and domestic supply and 
demand of major farm products have been basically well balanced.  …as 
policies limiting the export of resource products and products whose 
manufacture is energy intensive and highly polluting and policies 
encouraging imports and trade in services begin to take hold, the volume 
of imports should appropriately increase, the import and export mix 
should improve and the trade imbalance ease.  …strictly control the prices 
of commodities and services under government regulation. …must 
maintain an appropriate pace and intensity for government price 
regulation.  …Regulation of market prices will be strengthened.  
…Temporary measures will be taken earnestly when needed to hold down 
the prices of some key basic necessities. …ensure adequate market supply 
during flood season, peak times in summer and winter, the Olympic 
Games, and major holidays. …comprehensively deepen structural reforms 
and improve our open economy. …support and guide development of the 
nonpublic sector of the economy… 82 
The majority of the document reads like the above portion, with emphasis on using the 
market to answer shortfalls in domestic supply and continued reform in non-market 
sectors.  It insinuates continued liberalization and reform. 
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The tone of the document looks less open market in the area of agriculture.  It 
discussed developing a core grain production area and maintaining specific grain 
production numbers. 
We will strengthen the position of agriculture as the foundation of the 
economy and effectively promote the development of a new countryside. 
…We will promote steady growth in the production of major farm 
products. Arable land will be strictly protected, and protection of basic 
farmland in particular will be strengthened.  We will increase support for 
major grain producing areas and grain farmers.  We will institute the grain 
strategy project, accelerate development of core grain production areas 
and begin developing secondary production areas to keep grain output 
stable at about 500 million tons… The policy of grain subsidies will be 
strengthened and improved.83 
Would this dichotomy of open market and reform while developing a core 
agriculture capability be repeated in leadership and bureaucrat statements as well?  It was 
during the crisis.  Speaking in Japan during the G8 summit President Hu Jintao discussed 
the ongoing food crisis and made this charge: “the international community should give 
priority to developing agriculture and formulate a long-term international food 
cooperation strategy.”  He further outlined a strategy to overcome the crisis.  Hu said all 
countries must prioritize food production at the strategic level and raise grain production 
and grain reserves.  Developed countries programs should be financially aided by 
developed nations.  He called for an improved international trade environment that 
established a fair trade for agricultural goods and that all nations coordinate food issues at 
the national level so that the world could immediately respond to emergencies.  Finally 
the president saw the need for a balanced and well-rounded approach to food security that 
all took into account pollution, the environment, and energy efficiency.  Hu closed by 
saying, “China attaches great importance to agriculture and especially the food issue, 
which pursues a food security policy of relying on domestic supply, ensuring basic self- 
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sufficiency and striking a balance through appropriate import and export.” 84 It appeared 
agriculture concerns fell outside the free market and that all nations needed to focus on 
attaining a basic level of food self-sufficiency. 
The Chinese bureaucracy also echoed President Hu’s Japan speech.  In a broad 
survey of news articles open market reforms were encouraged while, when dealing with 
the specific issue of basic food products, self-sufficiency was stressed.  The fact that 
China imported fertilizer to realize its goal of 500 million metric tonnes of grain 
production did not seem to matter as much as the production of the grain itself.  Basic 
self-sufficiency through agricultural focus was enough.  And the statements focused  
not on the inputs but on the production outputs. 
After 2004 and especially during the most recent food crisis, food protection 
rhetoric was present and could translate into policies that inhibit continued liberalization, 
or worse, reverse it.  When looking at grain and fertilizer, rhetoric became policy. 
5. Grain and Fertilizer Trade 
The fertilizer trade completely shifted from state control in 1980 to the private 
sector  by 2000.  The grain market did not shift as quickly and suffered a series of 
retrenchments in the 1990s and in 2000 and 2002.  The authors found that the state 
trading companies behaved like their private counterparts.  By 2004, there were many 
thousand grain traders and that rice traded outside the control of the state.85  A 
retrenchment or resurgence of state control of the grain trade or in fertilizer controls 
would indicate China had ceased liberal reforms and returned to protectionism. 
Beijing viewed fertilizer as an important commodity and though fertilizer trading 
remained privatized, the government had been able to exert controls over it.  Beijing had 
an equal interest in grains.  The 2008 TPR found that grain procurement was still  
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controlled at some level by government trading.86  The 2008 food price crisis is an 
excellent example of how Beijing would react to suppress domestic price increases and 
retreat towards protectionism. 
At the beginning of 2008, as the world price for fertilizer began to rise because of 
the increase in transportation and manufacturing costs, Chinese fertilizer companies 
began to export larger amounts of fertilizer.  On 15 February, Beijing instituted export 
duties of 20-35% on four of the seven types of fertilizer, citing a 250% increase in the 
export of carbamide (urea) fertilizer and 280% increase in the export of monosodium 
phosphate fertilizer in the first two months of 2008.  On 17 April, the government 
widened and increased the tariffs on all seven types of fertilizer to a 100-135% duty on 
exports.  This duty was to remain in place from 30 April until 30 September 2008.  The 
increase in exports caused domestic supply shortages and price increases just as Chinese 
farmers were getting ready for the spring planting season.  Beijing hoped that the tariff 
increase would help control price increases and that the crisis not affect grain production 
adversely.87  
On 25 April, the COFCO’s general manager Yang Hong said the company—
which is responsible for Chinese rice export—would not restrict export even as India and 
Vietnam were.88  Five days later the Ministry of Commerce released a circular which 
seemed to indicate just the opposite as it “urged local authorities to strictly control grain 
and fertilizer exports and expand storage of farm produce to ensure domestic supply.”  
The press report stated food prices had risen 21% and that “the government has decided 
to scrap export rebates for most grains and impose export duties between 5%  and 25% 
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this year.”89  On 2 May, the General Administration of Customs stated export of various 
products to include fertilizer were down 10.5%, the export tariffs it appeared were 
beginning to take affect.  These tariffs were already implemented before two events 
occurred in rapid succession that would continue to affect China food prices.  On 3 May, 
a tropical cyclone ripped through a traditional rice exporter—Burma (Myanmar) and 
destroyed most of its rice crop.  On 12 May, as rice prices continued to spiral upward, a 
major earthquake hit Sichuan province, killing thousands and upsetting the provincial 
economy. 
Fertilizer export control measures only occurred in February 2008 after prices 
began to rise.  Grain policy also followed a similar path.  After record exports occurred in 
2007, domestic food prices began to rise in China in November.  In December 2007, in 
an effort to curb price increases, the Ministry of Finance announced a series of changes in 
the export scheme affecting grain export.  The 13% export rebate was eliminated on a 
wide range of grain products and an export tax was applied to wheat (20%), wheat 
products (25%), corn/rice/soybeans (5%), and processed corn/rice/soybeans (10%).  
These changes were implemented to try and curb food inflation which was reported to 
have increased 18.2% in November 2007 alone and set to continue until the end of 
2008.90 
Under the above conditions, China approached the latest Doha round of 
agriculture negotiations in July 2008.  While not directly related to the talks collapse, 
these conditions and the state of the world trade system probably contributed to the 
stalemate.  China did not resume market pricing for fertilizer until January 2009, after 
Beijing raised export taxes again to 150% in September 2008, and then held an NPC 
Council meeting chaired by Wen Jiabao in late December to consider the events.91  From 
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February 2008 until January 2009, while the fertilizer trading companies may have been 
private, Beijing ensured that these traders did not participate in the free market system 
and sell to the highest buyer.  During a crisis it seemed Beijing reverted to protectionism 
through its use of heavy handed export tariffs. 
E. EVALUATION OF DOMESTIC LIBERALIZATION 
Even after four years of upheaval and collapsed negotiations, Beijing continued a 
trend of market liberalization in market access and export subsidies.  Domestic supports 
and government transparency continued to hamper timely reporting on monies allocated 
to farming, as China’s overall agriculture budget increased. 
In other areas outside the pillars, the trend of market liberalization also continued.  
Land use indicated a continued expansion of labor intensive products, even while there 
was an expansion of less efficient crops.  Even considering the rise in rhetoric, and 
Beijing’s response to the 2008 food crisis showed a commitment to the market.  Rather 
than nationalize private industry, take over the export side of business, or permanently 
leave measures in place, Beijing chose to use market mechanisms to control its private 
enterprises.  Even though this did distort markets, it was less of a reaction than one that 
could have occurred—nationalization.  Liberalization continues, but at Beijing’s pace. 
Domestically, liber alization con tinued.  W hat would Beijing ’s n egotiations 
stances indicate?  
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IV. CHINESE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS  
In their study entitled Roots of Competitiveness, Rosen et al. asked the question: 
“Is China’s recent penchant for proliberalization talk on agriculture going to last?”92  To 
answer this question the authors reviewed China’s path to liberalization through 2004 and 
decided that it would continue.  Examining the more recent trade data and domestic 
issues has painted a less clear picture.  In the domestic realm it appeared that while China 
continued to work to meet and maintain its WTO commitments, during times of crisis it 
would revert to protectionist behaviors and protect its grain industry and production 
capability.  Transparency issues also added a black mark not found in the Rosen et al. 
report. 
How would the external side of agriculture negotiations change over the four year 
period, when compared to the findings on the domestic side of agriculture liberalization?  
The Rosen et al. work suggested that there were areas China could give way on to 
facilitate an end to the agriculture negotiations.  Based on their modeling, China has more 
to gain with a successful conclusion of the Doha round of negotiations than in a 
continued stalemate.  A wide ranged liberal agreement would benefit China most for it 
could require the same deep reforms China went through on other less open market 
economies and remove many of the advantages the developed nations accumulated 
through years of negotiations.  Even a less liberal final document would provide China 
some advantage and allow continued domestic reform without having to worry about a 
changing international negotiations process influenced by one crisis or another. 
Beijing’s negotiation stances should not change much, especially considering that 
little new agreement has been reached since 2004.  A compromise stance in an 
environment of failed negotiations and high prices could be a telling indicator of Chinese 
agriculture goals and point the direction future reform would likely take.   
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Rosen et al. discussed the various negotiations through 2004, again under the 
umbrella framework of the three pillars and other externalities.  They assessed that 
Beijing’s stances in market access would continue to favor developing nations by calling 
for a new tariff-protection mechanism and demanding low quota calculations when 
determining TRQ values.  Within export subsidies, China called on other members to 
completely eliminate all export subsides as it had agreed to in its accession agreement.  
Within the domestic supports pillar, Beijing’s negotiations stance resembled its subsidies 
stance—reduce, eliminate, or better govern the individual boxes.  Contrary to predictions, 
negotiations stances in market access, export subsidy, and domestic supports would not 
change much after 2004.  Outside the three pillars, two fundamental negotiations changes 
occurred after 2004 that are also worth considering: China’s participation in the DDA 
Sub-Committee for Cotton (SCC) and China’s expanding involvement in other formal 
and informal negotiations alliances. 
A. MARKET ACCESS 
Once a part of the WTO and included in the agriculture talks, Beijing’s position 
became one of an equal, not one seeking membership.  It no longer had to worry about 
tariff rate changes and negotiating TRQ products.  It now could focus on making the 
system work to support its own interests.  China’s negotiations team worked to remind 
WTO members that the latest agriculture negotiation round was a development round and 
should focus on improving the lot of the developing country members.  Rural 
development, food security, and farmer security were all items needing to be addressed, 
as most of these countries’ poor were engaged in farming.  And any goal tied to 
development would help eliminate poverty.  China tied development to each of the sub-
areas under market access: special privileges for developing members, the Tariff Rate 
Quota system, and its stance on developed nations Special Safe Guard exemptions.  
China continued the trend established prior to 2004 and continued to lobby for longer 
implementation timelines.  It reinforced its remaining TRQ products and adjusted the 
quota to meets its domestic needs.  Finally, it continued to attempt to implement a new 
Special Safeguard Mechanism that favored developing nations. 
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1. Special Privileges for New Members / Developing Countries 
Up through 2004, China proposed that special product exemptions and time line 
considerations be given to developing nations and RAM in whatever tariff modality was 
chosen—at that time siding with the equation that lowered tariff peaks.93  Beijing also 
had other concerns that fell outside the three pillars, but were raised either in statements 
or during 2001-2004 negotiations.  The special treatments developed nations garnered 
through 60 years of membership remained a target of Beijing trade negotiations.     
Rosen et al. assessed China would back away from stances calling for special 
privileges for various member states.  Between 2004 and 2006, China remained 
committed to special privileges and did not back away from that demand.  Its focused on 
economic groups of members, each with issues that China believed need to be addressed 
in negotiations.  The first broad group consisted of those members who recently joined 
the WTO.  The second broad group encompassed developing member who tied certain 
products directly to well-being, food security, and poverty reduction.  The other broad 
group consisted of those small and fragile states with limited production capabilities and 
significant infrastructure and governance problems (often referred to as the least 
developed countries—LDC and small and vulnerable economies—SVE).94  It is in the 
first two groups that China’s stances came into conflict with developed member states.  
No member denied that the LDC required assistance and special treatment, but members 
have significantly different views on what special dispensations other member states 
should have. 
a. Recently Acceded Members Support 
China maintained the stance that Recently Acceded Members (RAM) 
should be granted special treatment.  Beijing argued that China as well as other RAM 
agreed to significantly more structural changes and fundamental trade adjustments than 
members who joined the organization under GATT accession rules.  RAM had to agree 
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to significant tariff cuts and other market access mechanisms and should be exempted 
from further trade liberalization initiatives until other members implement similar tariff 
adjustments.  If not exempt, Beijing demanded RAM receive longer implementation 
periods, starting further reforms after other members. 
In late 2003 and early 2004, Beijing and the G-20 made four statements 
calling for special treatment afforded to RAM.  As ministers were picking up the pieces 
of the failed 2003 talks, both China and the G-20 highlighted that RAM concerns needed 
to be addressed in any follow-on negotiations.  In May 2004, the G-20 presented a 
statement against the formulas suggested by the United States and European Community, 
highlighting that it did not address RAM timeline concerns.  China also stated as much in 
its meeting statement later in the month.95  While making these statements supporting 
RAM concerns, China and the G-20 also supported Special and Differential (S&D) 
treatment for developing countries.   
Through 2006, Rosen et al.’s prediction seemed to hold true that China 
would back away from calls to give RAM certain deadline extensions.  Neither China nor 
the  G-20 made any statement discussing RAM requirements.  RAM issues were 
mentioned briefly in early 2006.  During its trade policy review in March, Beijing 
ministers said, “In this new round of negotiations, special concerns of newly acceded 
Members including China should be recognized and respected.”96  Only after talks 
collapsed again later in 2006, did RAM issues receive better attention.  In early 2007,  
RAM laid out their demands formally.  The RAM proposal would receive support from 
the other trade blocs and individual countries.  In the March 2007 proposal, RAM called 
for at least a five year implementation period longer than other developing country 
members for any agreement, a no average tariff cut commitment and a special safe guard 
mechanism on certain products.  It also proposed that for any AMS calculation, subsidies 
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to agriculture inputs and investment must not be included in the formula.97  Before the 
proposal was submitted, RAM laid out the reasons for these agricultural requirements 
during a February trade meeting on Market Access for Non-Agricultural (NAMA) 
products:     
The position of the RAMs which calls for a differentiated treatment within 
these negotiations is legitimate due to the fact that in the process of 
accession the RAMs assumed extensive level of commitments in all WTO 
areas, distinguishing thereby the group from the rest of the membership. In 
this regard, RAMs consider that the aim of this development round should 
not be to deepen already existing discrepancies between developing 
members, or to disadvantage those that have done their share in 
contributing extensively to the world trading system. Instead, members 
should pursue an approach that takes into account different realities which 
exist among their schedules and envisages more balanced outcome. …The 
present level of RAMs commitments could hardly be reached by other 
developing and many developed countries as the result of this round’s 
reductions, even if the round would produce more ambitious results. At 
the same time this advanced level for RAMs represents the starting point 
for the implementation of the DDA commitments.98  
China continued such calls in 2007, highlighting RAM concerns in other minister 
statements and through supporting the statements of other RAM countries.99 
b. Developing Country Special Privileges  
While implementation timelines and limited cuts were at the center of 
RAM demands, China shifted the focus to food security issues for other developing 
country demands. While Beijing supported RAM timeline and tariff issues in 2004 and 
2007, it maintained the same negotiating stance concerning developing nation members 
and special privileges over the entire time period studied; never appearing to back away 
from the issue nor appearing to compromise.  The reason for this hard stance is different 
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than the one presented to defend its RAM stances.  China and other developing nations 
argued that there are certain agriculture products tied directly to a developing country’s 
well being, food security, and ability to reduce poverty.  These products require S&D 
treatment in the face of developed countries’ ability to export to the world market and 
affect domestic prices.             
China first mentioned special entitlements after the 2003 impasse, when 
commenting on developed nation’s proposals for the formulas that would govern tariff 
reductions.  At that time, China noted the formulas proposed would force developing 
nations with S&D products to make higher cuts than developed members and called not 
to support it.100  China’s call was also supported through various G-20 statements as 
well.  The G-20 statement in 2005 continued the call for developing nation privileges 
especially for food security and poverty elimination concerns.  The G-20 noted that any 
final tariff reduction formula had to allow developing countries to make less deep cuts to 
high tariffs than the developed, and again linked these requirements to developing 
countries on the basis of food security and quality of life - poverty reduction issues.101  
These same points were stressed again in the September 2005, statement by the G-20.102  
In September 2005, the G-20 also put forth its recommended formula for linear tariff 
reduction amongst the members.  It maintained less cuts by developing countries than by 
developed and maintained S&D for developing countries because of domestic food 
security issues.103  
China did not let the G-20 solely speak for its interests in creating product 
protections for developing countries.  During its comprehensive Trade Policy Review 
conducted in 2006, Beijing ministers dedicated a whole section of remarks usually used 
for defending domestic policies instead to present its view on the DDA and the 
requirement of S&D for developing countries to limit market access by developed 
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members.  It also stated that any formula must reduce high tariffs and that developed 
countries make more cuts (money-wise) than the developing world.104  A combined 
statement from the PRC, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka called for the delayed timeline 
implementation for developing countries as well.105 
Negotiations collapsed in 2006 and China stated in a general meeting, 
“We strongly urge members, particularly the major developed countries, to consider 
major movement on domestic support and carry out major reforms on agriculture.  At the 
same time to be more flexible concerning S&D treatment for developing countries.”106  
China continued a call in all its areas of position in spring 2007, with a broad statement 
that included developing country S&D: 
… Finally, it was more than necessary to emphasize that this Round was a 
Development Round.  Its outcome had to deliver developmental benefits 
to all developing-country Members and help address their specific 
concerns and needs.  Such important issues as S&D treatment, SPs, SSM, 
cotton, specific concerns of LDCs, SVEs and recently-acceded Members 
had to be dealt with earnestly, comprehensively and effectively.  … China 
would, as always, play a constructive role, together with other G-20 and 
G-33 Members, to ensure that the Doha Round delivered meaningful 
benefits to all Members, in particular to developing ones.107 
China never backed away from its stance on privileges for developing nations or 
recently acceded members.  It remained committed to negotiating longer implementation 
periods and other special advantages for both groups and will likely do so in the future. 
2. TRQ Stance in Negotiations Prior to 2004 
China desired low foreign access to specially designated domestic commodity 
markets, during the accession process.  Having implemented the TRQ scheme, the 
previous chapter revealed Beijing’s resistance to open further.  Prior to 2003, its stance 
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on the quota amount reflected this as concern to protect certain products.  Its proposal 
was that the in-tariff amount would never be more than 5% of the commercial cereal 
market and 8-10% on non-cereals.  Beijing wanted to limit TRQ to low percentage levels 
for developing countries, and any rates be calculated based not on total country 
consumption but only on market consumption—that which is consumed on the farm or 
locally is exempt.108 
3. TRQ and Negotiations from 2004-2008 
While negotiating to join GATT / WTO, China agreed to a TRQ scheme that 
provided some market accesses in sensitive areas but controlled amounts and tariff rates.  
To continue along a market liberalization regime, China could eliminate these limitations 
and open up all TRQ imports at a lower rate.  While China did lower and then do away 
with the TRQ for edible oils in 2006 as agreed to at accession, there were no other formal 
changes.  During the 2004 transitional review, China supported the TRQ system as 
working well and that it had opened new accesses to Chinese markets to foreign 
competition.109  During the 2006 transitional review, China again noted it would not 
make any changes to the system; even with a product it desperately needed—cotton: 
“Lastly, regarding the tariff quota for cotton, China believed that providing additional 
market access opportunities on a voluntary basis in response to special market 
circumstances was quite different from making new binding concessions.  China stated 
that, at present, it was not in a position to eliminate the tariff quota system in place for 
cotton.”110   
In a 2007 meeting, China again stated its commitment to an intact TRQ system 
and it appeared it had no plans to change it.  “The practice of the past few years shows 
that the tariff quota system played an important role in food security and stability of the 
Chinese grains market.  So far, China has no plans to terminate the tariff quota 
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system.”111  The TRQ system in China has never been a point of serious contention 
afterwards and China will likely retain it as it is the only mechanism it has to protect a 
few vital commodities. 
Maintaining the TRQ system in itself is not a step backwards.  At times, Beijing 
opened imports at the in-tariff rate even when it could have charged a much higher one as 
noted earlier.  The fact the world price for various commodities has remained higher than 
the domestic one has not really taxed the system to see how China will respond in the 
face of increased demand to sell to China domestic markets.  Also, China has made no 
other proposal calculating TRQ rates than the one noted by Rosen et al.  This indicates 
China remains committed to low accesses and that rates are calculated not on an overall 
consumption, but only on those amounts sold on a commercial market. 
4. Special Safeguards versus Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSG/SSM) 
China was not allowed access to the special tariff protections other nations had 
received during the Uruguay Round of talks decades earlier.  Instead, Beijing was 
allowed the TRQ process, though the out-tariff rate was not close to some safeguards that 
allowed significantly higher rates.  Prior to 2004, China and other developing nations 
desired to see the developed nations remove the existing protection system and 
implement a new one that provided advantage and protection to the developing nation 
markets.  Beijing called for the elimination of the existing Special Safeguards (SSG) 
system that favored developed members.  The old SSG system applied only to members 
that transitioned to the overarching tariff system during the Uruguay Round of talks and 
only on those products members converted to the overarching system.  Most of the 
developing world did not transition at that time, including China and India, so they were 
not eligible for SSG protections.112  Beijing supported the proposal to create a new 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM)  that benefited developing members.  A new SSM  
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would protect developing member markets with increased import duties when the 
international market became unstable or could potentially damage the developing 
country’s market.   
In 2004, China highlighted the importance of the SSG/SSM issue.  In 2005, 
Beijing maintained the identical position of the G-20.113  The G-20 statement specifically 
called for a new SSM scheme based on food and livelihood security coupled with rural 
development.114  China went back on record during the Trade Policy Review in 2006 to 
provide its stance on a range of issues—one calling for support of the new SSM scheme:  
China supports the elimination of all kinds of export subsidies provided by 
developed Members, substantial reduction of trade-distorting domestic 
support, and significant reduction of tariff peaks and tariff escalation in 
developed Members.  Meanwhile, there should be effective solution of the 
specific concerns of developing Members relating to special products and 
special safeguard mechanism.115 
After the collapse of talks in 2006, China maintained its position and also 
supported the statement made by the G-33 regarding the “core development instruments 
such as Special Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism.” 116  Later in the same 
meeting it made its own statement after it first backed up the G-33 statement.  It 
reaffirmed: 
In discussing market access for agricultural products, one should always 
bear in mind the different roles that agriculture played in developed and 
developing-country economies.  For the latter, agriculture was the basic 
means of survival for billions of subsistence farmers.  Therefore, the 
legitimate concerns of developing-country Members on Special Products 
and the Special Safeguard Mechanism had to be fully addressed. 117   
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China continued a call in all its areas of position in spring 2007,  
Finally, it was more than necessary to emphasize that this Round was a 
Development Round.  Its outcome had to deliver developmental benefits 
to all developing-country Members and help address their specific 
concerns and needs.  Such important issues as S&D treatment, SPs, SSM, 
cotton, specific concerns of LDCs, SVEs and recently-acceded Members 
had to be dealt with earnestly, comprehensively and effectively.  … China 
would, as always, play a constructive role, together with other G-20 and 
G-33 Members, to ensure that the Doha Round delivered meaningful 
benefits to all Members, in particular to developing ones.”118 
In May 2007, China continued to highlight the importance of an effective SSM and its 
role in food security. 119  China never backed down on its call to remove the SSG and 
implement a new system that benefited developing nations.  This was one of the points of 
contention in 2008, when the trade talks collapsed. 
Once again, China did not back away from its 2003 stance.  As this issue is tied 
directly to developing nations’ special privileges, it is unlikely to walk away from this 
stance in the future. 
B. EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
China’s negotiations stances in the export subsidies pillar have similar themes as 
the previous one.  Prior to 2004, Beijing desired a significant reduction in existing export 
subsidies amongst member nations and wanted an extended implementation timeline for 
developing nations (six instead of three years).  As part of the G-20, Beijing has also 
requested negotiations to commence on the complete elimination of all export subsidies 
by all members, not just reductions over time.120 
China stated it had eliminated all export subsidies, and probably did so by 2006.  
Evaluation of land use and export of corn in an earlier Section provided compelling 
evidence that China indeed eliminated its last export subsidy.  In negotiations since 2004, 
it never backed away from its export subsidies stance, either in solo statements or when it 
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supported one of the various trade negotiations alliances.  In multiple statements between 
2003 and trade talk collapses in 2008, it called for the elimination of export subsidies.   
The G-20 called for elimination in late 2003 and China’s statement both 
supported the G-20 and added that a specific date be set for export subsidies to end world 
wide.121  Beijing made similar statements in 2004 and in 2005.122  The G-20 also called 
for a halt on increased export subsidies that it perceived emerging in the spring of 2005 
and again called all members to eliminate all export subsides.123  In September 2005, the 
G-20 again called to halt the increase and eliminate all export subsidies within five 
years.124  During its Trade Policy Review in 2006, and then again in general statements at 
council sessions in 2007, Beijing continued its call for all members to move to eliminate 
all export subsidies.125 
The 2004 developed nation subsidy distortions Rosen et al. noted continued to 
polarize the negotiations field.  China would not back away from this issue from 2004 to 
2008, and will likely not drop the issue in the future.  Having eliminated these subsidies, 
it is in Beijing’s best interests to get other nations to eliminate them as well. 
C. DOMESTIC SUPPORTS GOVERNANCE AND ELIMINATION 
As mentioned in the previous Section, this is the most difficult pillar to study for 
it encapsulates all trade distortions not located in the other pillars and is dependent on 
government transparency and self-reporting.  To further complicate the third pillar, 
negotiations often focus not on reducing the box amounts, but on squabbles between 
countries over definitions.  How a member’s domestic support program was classified is 
important because all supports that fall into the Amber Box are totaled, generating the 
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AMS figure.  AMS can only be a certain percent of the gross value of domestic 
agriculture production and going above the percentage negotiated during the Uruguay 
Round violates the WTO agreement. 
1. Domestic Support Negotiations Prior to 2003 
Between accession and 2004, China maintained its stance advocating developing 
member exceptions while pushing for developed nation reform.  It advocated returning 
all Blue Box programs back into the Amber Box and reducing the 5% AMS limit applied 
to developed nations.  Negotiators also called for better definitions and higher standards 
to aid in reforming and eliminating programs in the Green Box.  Rosen et al. summoned 
up the Chinese position in this pillar as “a proponent of robust reform and reduction in 
domestic support.”126  China reinforced its position through G-20 statements as well; the 
G-20 requested specific product reductions within the AMS system, reduction in allowed 
percentages of the various boxes, and better definitions and standards for the Green 
Box.127 
2. Domestic Support Negotiations Maintained through 2008 
China’s use of domestic supports and the statements its ministers made from 
2004-2008 have roughly corresponded with one another though it is important to repeat 
that China has not reported any official domestic support numbers for any year after 
2001.  As with the SSG/SSM debate, only certain countries have access to the Blue Box; 
newly joined countries do not gain access.  China has much to gain from developed 
countries elimination of distorting supports.  It is not surprising then to see that China has 
maintained an elimination stance.   
In 2004 and 2005, China called for a deadline for substantial reductions in both 
Amber and Blue Box supports and then reaffirmed it would not go above the limits it had 
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placed on itself with the AMS system.128  The G-20 discussed its position in 2005, and 
called twice for better governance and definitions for Blue Box and Green Box (supports 
that are not product specific and do not distort trade) areas and insisted developing 
nations should not face reductions in the current level of AMS.129 
China again laid out its position in 2006 after trade talks collapsed, highlighting 
reduced domestic supports and subsidies as a corner stone of its stance: 
We strongly urge members, particularly the major developed countries, to 
consider major movement on domestic support and carry out major 
reforms on agriculture.  …This is a development round and agriculture lies 
in the centre of the whole round and the removal of trade distortion in 
agriculture caused by the enormous agriculture subsidies is the essential 
task for this round.  Unless this issue is properly address there cannot 
possibly be a success of the round.130 
It again repeated this stance in October 2007.  During its annual trade review in 
December 2007, Beijing noted that it had provided no AMS qualifying monies in 2007 
and called for the developed world to improve.  It is not surprising then that China 
continued its focus on domestic support elimination at Geneva in July 2008.131  With its 
commitment to stances benefiting the developing members, it will continue to call for a 
reduction and/or elimination of developed members domestic supports for the foreseeable 
future. 
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D. CHINA AND THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON COTTON 
Cotton is a new area to consider since the Rosen et al. report.  At Cancun in 2003, 
various members argued whether the issues surrounding cotton should be maintained 
within agriculture or if it should fall out into the greater trade arena.  By 2004, it was 
commonly agreed that cotton would be dealt with under agriculture by a special sub-
committee.  This sub-committee focused both on the trade issues and the domestic 
development issues that surround the commodity.  China has been an active member of 
this negotiation forum and its negotiations since 2004 provided a new area within 
agriculture to be used to determine how consistent its negotiations are for such an 
important commodity. 
China’s negotiations in the agriculture Sub-Committee on Cotton (SCC) also 
provide another area to evaluate China’s agriculture reforms and commitment to trade 
liberalization.  China is the world’s largest consumer of international cotton and is the 
largest textile exporter in the world.  China’s cotton fields cover almost 30 million 
hectares of arable land tilled by 100 million farmers.  Tens of millions more work in 
producing textiles for world markets.  Cotton is the one crop that provides subsistence to 
the rural poor and is a primary input driving China’s light industry.  It is then expected 
that China would maintain a negotiations stance that limited international price 
distortions.  Cotton is one primary product that Beijing cannot afford to compromise. 
In December 2003, China called for the resolution of the cotton issue in the 
general meeting and subsequently agreed to participate in the SCC.  At the first SCC 
meeting in 2005, China supported African cotton producers’ statement and used the 
meeting to call to eliminate not just cotton but all subsidies.  At later meetings it again 
called for elimination of domestic support that distorted trade by the developed nations 
“to protect the interest of cotton farmers in developing country Members whose 
livelihood depends on cotton.”132  In 2005, Beijing also went on the record to support 
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India’s statement, which had called for the same changes.133  With no resolution at the 
end of 2005, China pointed out that it had started working with African countries to 
export cotton to the Chinese markets through a holistic program to include debt 
forgiveness, aid, and education.134   
China maintained its stance in 2006, continuing to call for developed nations to 
eliminate domestic supports to cotton, keeping in mind the problems of security and 
employment and social stability in developing countries.  It was making similar pleas in 
other areas of negotiations and the SCC acted as another platform to maintain its 
position.135  The G-20 in 2007, also mirrored China’s cotton stance and called for the 
elimination of subsidies and specifically recalled the decision previously in Hong Kong; 
“the elimination of all forms of export subsides granted to cotton by developed 
countries.”136  China then took up that call at the May 2007 general meeting when it 
attacked the current SSG system.  Beijing noted the lack of movement by developed 
countries on the issue of subsidies, how SSM plays a vital role in food security issues and 
the issues of the African cotton producers.137  China’s cotton negotiations in no way 
deviated from its other agriculture stances. 
China’s negotiation stance in cotton mirrored its stances in the three trade pillars.  
It can ill-afford to allow itself to be disadvantaged by the world trading system.  There is 
the potential of alliance fragmentation.  China is the world’s largest user of cotton 
because of its textile industry.  It is in China’s textile interests to keep the price of cotton 
low, thus affecting the quality of life of Africa cotton farmers.  If there is no headway on  
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leveling the advantage the developed world holds in subsidies, supports, and tariff 
protections, cotton could be the product that will face China against other developing 
nations.   
E. 2008 TRADE TALK COLLAPSE IN GENEVA 
On 21 July 2008, the world’s trade ministers commenced yet another round of 
agriculture trade talks in Geneva, attempting to finally close the DDA.  A week later the 
trade negotiations appeared to have stalled.  One of the first indications that little 
compromise had occurred was when Zhang Xiangchen, head of the WTO Affairs of the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce, accused the United States of demanding that developing 
nations agree to lower their legally existing tariffs before the United States would end its 
illegal trade distorting subsidies in cotton.138  An old argument that had surfaced again 
and again over the last four years in all areas of agriculture negotiations remained 
undecided.  Additionally, the call to eliminate the developed world’s SSG and develop a 
SSM that protected developing world farm markets came to the forefront of issues with 
no compromise.  A consensus could not be reached between India and the United States 
on what price increase percent would trigger the SSM for a developing country and how 
high the tariff response could be.139 After the collapse of talks, India and China’s trade 
ministers concurred that the United States looked to enhance its access to developing 
nation’s markets while India and China were looking out for the interests of farmers’ 
livelihoods.  The United States countered with concerns that the triggering point on the 
SSM for developing nations was set too low, and that India and China were the main 
impediments to trade talk progress.140  In any case, China and India’s concerns over 
subsidies and their call to develop a new SSM agreement were not new. 
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But there was one other level to this derailment.  The New York Times wrote 
after the trade talks collapsed:  
Since joining the W.T.O. in November 2001, China has been an outspoken 
defender of free-trade principles. It has been especially critical of the 
United States, for example, for invoking so-called safeguard rules to 
prevent an increase of Chinese textile imports that threatened to put 
American manufacturers out of business. But this week, China allied itself 
with Indian negotiators in insisting on safeguard rules for agriculture, and 
sought to require that developing countries be allowed to impose 
prohibitively high tariffs on food imports from affluent countries to halt 
increases in imports that might put farmers in poor countries out of 
business.  When the United States and other food exporters refused to 
accept the Chinese and Indian positions, the talks broke down.141   
Should the United States have been surprised when China backed India’s 
position?  Evaluating China’s positions in negotiations and in official positions as already 
documented, and comparing them to statements made by India and the G-20, indicate that 
China was in India’s corner from the beginning and spoke publicly to aid a trade ally. 
F. CHINA, THE G-20, AND OTHER WTO ALLIANCES 
Not to appear recalcitrant and impede negotiations with its own trade demands, 
China showed its commitment to agriculture talks when it became a part of the nascent 
G-20 negotiation group.142  China needed to join a camp of negotiations rather than try to 
go at its demands alone; allying with a group of similarly interested countries to reach a 
common goal also insulated China from being singled out and criticized for a proposed 
stance.  Rosen et al. found that by belonging to the group China had actually accepted a 
middle road with regard to tariff decreases.  Beijing noted dismay over how various G-20 
members had behaved after the failed negotiations in Cancun and People’s Daily press  
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questioned the validity of Chinese membership.143  How China positioned itself and 
maneuvered in negotiations between 2004 and 2008 with the G-20 could also determine 
where China desired to go regarding the market. 
When evaluating China’s stances in agriculture, and then looking at the G-20 
statements at the same time it is clear to see how close China’s stances are with those of 
the G-20.  As discussed above, regarding special privileges, SSG/SSM, export subsidies, 
domestic supports, and in cotton the two share the same stances.  The G-20 gave 
developing members an avenue to present formula proposals on modalities from within a 
unified position without first presenting them as a single member.  (The assumption 
remains that any proposal presented was previously negotiated inside the group and has 
the approval of every member.)  By presenting such proposals from a unified front it 
insulated China from critical responses.  From this position, specific developed nations’ 
policies can also be attacked; again providing a degree of separation and not risk being 
singled out in critical responses.     
One example of critical behavior regarded modalities.  The G-20 in 2004, 
attacked the United States and European Community supported modality formula on 
tariff reductions and then later presented one more amiable to developing nations.144  The 
G-20 also singled out the proposed United States Farm Bill in 2007, and was very critical 
of the amount of subsidies it allowed.  In this same statement, “there was still a need to 
see movement by the major players in domestic support and market access,” and called 
for the elimination of export subsidies.145  China did not have to open itself up to 
criticism by submitting a formula proposal on its own or attacking the U.S. Farm Bill on 
its own.   
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In December 2007, the G-20 set the stance from which India and then China 
would argue from in Geneva in 2008:   
…The range and complexity of the distorting policies applied by 
developed countries required comprehensive solutions in export 
competition, domestic support and market access.  Partial movements and 
in each pillar were not sufficient to ensure meaningful or acceptable 
results in the negotiations.  Developed countries were accountable for the 
main distortions and restrictions in agriculture.146 
The fact then that China backed India openly in the 2008 negotiations should not have 
surprised anyone.  China and India allied themselves five years previously within the G-
20 and continued to echo each other’s positions in many forums.  Neither China, nor 
India can ill afford to abandon the G-20, for it provides a balance to the developed 
nations that no one country within the G-20 can accomplish.  India, China, Brazil, and 
South Africa, as the four largest G-20 countries, together exported $1.6 trillion and 
imported $1.4 trillion worth of goods and services in 2007.  The United States, in 
comparison, exported $1.2 trillion and brought in $2.0 trillion the same year.  Germany, 
as the largest trade member of the EU, exported $1.3 trillion and purchased $1.1 trillion 
in goods and services.147  The G-20 provides its members a comparable market interest 
as the top developed members of the WTO. 
Since the 2004 Rosen et al. report, it appeared China had become more adept on 
the world negotiations stage.  Its stances, though, do not appear to be about continued 
domestic reform but instead have become more outward focused; looking for trade 
liberalization and market access in foreign markets.  Interestingly, in the last five years, 
its negotiations stances have been echoed by other member states and the G-20.  But is 
that the end of the trend or is China working in other alliances as well? 
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WTO meeting minutes and various member proposals document increased 
support to the G-20 and China’s position since 2004.  In March 2005, the G-20 indicated 
it was participating at some level with other informal negotiations groups to coordinate 
the development dimension of the DDA: 
Ministers emphasized that the G-20 is actively engaged in an intense 
dialogue with other Groups and individual Members.  In this regard, G-20 
Ministers welcomed the invitation to the Coordinators of the Africa 
Group, ACP Countries, CARICOM, G-33 and LDCs to the meeting.  
Ministers strongly believe that such coordination will contribute 
significantly towards realizing the development dimension of the Doha 
Work Programme.  In this regard, Ministers cautioned against any move 
that would create divisions among developing countries, including through 
further categorization.148 
The G-20 statement to the WTO in September 2005, again emphasized it was meeting 
with other organizations:  
Ministers stressed the need to give priority to strengthening alliances 
between the G-20 and other developing country groups.  Ministers 
welcomed the invitation to the coordinators of the G-33, Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), the African Group, ACP countries, and CARICOM. 
Ministers emphasized that the G-20 should continue to work together with 
other groups, including the G-90, and individual Members with the aim of 
strengthening convergences and ensuring that the development dimension 
of the Doha work programme is achieved.149 
At the end of 2005, Paraguay, on behalf of the Informal Group of Developing 
Countries, placed similar demands on developed countries that have already been 
mentioned earlier.  It did not mention other organizations: 
 … it is regrettable that negotiations in [agriculture] remain at a stand-still 
due to the unwillingness by some developed country Members to put in 
place agricultural reforms that would significantly improve the conditions 
of access to their markets by products from the majority of developing 
countries.  This lack of progress and the lack of meaningful proposals that 
would improve the conditions for access to the markets of developed 
countries shows a lack of will in complying with the development  
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objectives as stated in the Doha Ministerial Declaration. …We have seen 
only limited progress on the part of the developed countries in eliminating 
the use of tariff peaks and tariff escalation.150 
After talks collapsed in 2006, the G-20 again referred to the common cause of the various 
existing organizations and that these groups had met after the collapse:   
The representative of Brazil, on behalf of the G-20, said that when the G-
20 Ministers and other developing-country group coordinators—for the  
G-33, the ACP countries, the LDCs, the SVEs, the C-4, and the NAMA-
11-had met in Rio on 9 September, they had deeply regretted the 
suspension of the DDA negotiations.151 
The following spring, China also announced it would work with many of the 
organizations to bring about a successful conclusion to the DDA negotiations. 
 …it was more than necessary to emphasize that this Round was a 
Development Round.  Its outcome had to deliver developmental benefits 
to all developing-country Members and help address their specific 
concerns and needs.  Such important issues as S&D treatment, SPs, SSM, 
cotton, specific concerns of LDCs, SVEs and recently-acceded Members 
had to be dealt with earnestly, comprehensively and effectively.  … China 
would, as always, play a constructive role, together with other G-20 and 
G-33 Members, to ensure that the Doha Round delivered meaningful 
benefits to all Members, in particular to developing ones.152 
In March 2007, the G-20 mentioned that it and/or some of its membership were ready to 
look at other forms of cooperation with cotton producers in Africa, possibly outside the 
WTO agreement: 
…the G-20 recalls that several of its Members have been extending 
assistance to the [Cotton-4] and other cotton-producing countries in 
Africa.  Those countries and other G-20 Members wish to indicate their 
                                                 
150 WTO, “Communication from the Informal Group of Developing Countries,” WTO Document # 
WT/MIN (05)/32, 18 December 2005, 1,2. 
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willingness to explore with beneficiary countries other forms of 
cooperation, either bilaterally or through the African Union.153 
In December 2007, at the WTO general meeting, the various representatives presented 
statements to the floor that looked to set the negotiations platform to be used by China 
and India in Geneva in 2008.  First Brazil spoke for the G-20 and said, “The G-20 would 
continue to work closely with other developing countries with a view to achieving a 
timely, balanced and proportionate outcome that was acceptable to all.”154    Then, 
Indonesia, as the representative for the G-33 spoke:  
There had been no strong signs or indication by other Members that they 
were willing to move and to make new significant contributions in the 
crucial areas of these negotiations, including, and especially, on Special 
Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism. …It should also be clear 
that the G-33 was firm as well as united, and would be in a very difficult 
position to consider and join any consensus if its concerns and interests on 
SPs and SSM were not completely addressed. … Once again, the G-33 
called on all Members, in particular the major developed countries, to 
show the necessary flexibility required for the successful and meaningful 
outcome of the agriculture negotiations.155 
Then South Africa spoke for NAMA-11, which worked outside agriculture but spoke to 
agriculture in its group statement.  It appeared NAMA-11 was prepared to harden its 
negotiations in areas outside agriculture and not negotiate until agriculture concerns were 
addressed by the developed nations: 
…It was clear that one could not prejudge the ambition in NAMA while 
the ambition in Agriculture had not been settled.  As the NAMA-11 had 
stated before, it was only fair that those developed-country Members who 
wanted a high level of ambition in NAMA should earn it by, among other 
things, making real cuts in their agricultural tariffs and trade-distorting 
subsidies, and agreeing to a tariff cap and the elimination of the SSG, 
before demanding onerous commitments by developing countries in 
NAMA.156 
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China spoke much later in the meeting after other groups had presented statements 
supporting the developing member nations.  
China supported the statements by Brazil for the G-20, Indonesia for the 
G-33 and South Africa for the NAMA-11, as well as the statements by 
Uganda for the African Group, Jamaica for the ACP, Lesotho for the 
LDCs and Barbados for the SVEs. … it hoped other Members—
particularly the major developed countries—would show flexibilities… 
Development issues such as Implementation, S&D treatment, SP and 
SSM, Cotton, Trips and CBD, specific concerns of LDCs, SVEs and 
recently-acceded Members should be dealt with earnestly and 
effectively.157 
A common stance and references to other developing nations was not an anomaly.  
China continued this trend in the spring of 2008 during its trade policy review: 
…the special concerns of G20, G33, NAMA 11, the LDCs, the SVEs, the 
Cotton 4, the ACP Group, the African Group, RAMs and other developing 
country groupings should be effectively addressed in this Round.158 
The sam e day in th e ge neral m eeting China dr ew further re ferences to the developing 
nations and the various trade negotiations teams: 
Development issues such as SPs, SSM, cotton, specific concerns of LDCs, 
SVEs and RAMs had to be dealt with earnestly, comprehensively and 
effectively.  …China together with many other developing countries 
strongly urged that text-based negotiations on [outstanding 
implementation issues] be started immediately, and that the outcome be an 
integral part of the final single undertaking result of the DDA.159 
Three months later, China would be blamed in western press for siding with India 
and destroying any progress made at the agriculture talks in Geneva.  Based on a review 
of the statements made by many developing countries, either alone or through a formal 
negotiations group, China and India’s position as stated in the G-20 statements had 
gained considerable support.  While the individual trade ministers were blamed for the 
collapse, the positions they took had already been established and supported by the  
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developing members.  Looking at the statements of various trade group representatives 
clearly shows China and the G-20 have allied themselves with more and more developing 
nation groups.   
When looking just at China negotiation stances after 2004 it did not appear that 
much changed from that laid out in Roots of Competitiveness.  China remained 
committed to securing special treatments for developing nations and recently acceded 
nations, would not further negotiate its TRQ system, and desired the elimination of the 
advantage secured by developed nations through the SSG.  While amounts and values are 
possibly up for negotiation, the root issues are not and will likely remain on the 
negotiations table for the foreseeable future.  The most significant finding from 
examination of trade negotiations after 2004 is the number of developing nation groups 
that support China and India.   While the stances did not change, alliance participation 
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Would Beijing continue trade liberalization after the failed WTO agriculture 
negotiations in 2003, 2006, and 2008?  Rosen et al. assessed trade liberalization would 
continue.160  How would Beijing react in the interim while world negotiators faced off 
over subsidies, domestic supports, and the modality to be used to decide final tariff rates?  
Rosen et al. concluded a wide ranged liberal agreement would benefit China most for it 
would require the same deep reforms China went through to other market economies and 
remove many of the advantages the developed nations have accumulated through years of 
negotiations.  When looking at the domestic angle of trade liberalization since 2004 in the 
areas studied by Rosen et al., little has changed and further change is probably not 
expected.    International negotiations stances regarding the three pillars of agriculture 
also have not changed since 2004 and have become more complex.  What are the 
implications of little change in domestic or international negotiations areas? 
A. DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS 
The market access, export subsidies, and domestic support trade pillars all 
changed little since 2004.  In market access, tariff rates and TRQ study are probably not 
the best way to continue to evaluate trade liberalization in China.  For export subsidies, 
the same observation holds true once China eliminated subsidies in corn.  Finally, 
different factors must be found to determine how China is supporting its agriculture 
sector that does not depend on member reporting.   
1. Market Access 
China continues trade liberalization, just not within Rosen et al.’s measurable 
factors.       Tariff rates and rates adjustments to meet the TRQ scheme are no longer a 
sufficient measure of market liberalization in China.  China attained a final bound rate of 
15.3% for WTO agriculture products in 2005, five years ahead of schedule and met its 
obligations with edible cooking oils in 2006.  It no longer had to change to meet its WTO 
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accessions agreements and past statements by its trade ministers suggest further change in 
this area is unlikely.  Under the agreement, it is allowed to protect its rice, sugar, corn, 
and cotton industries at some level as long as it allows market access through the quota 
system.  While there have been some concerns about unfilled quotas and their 
reallocation, the whole scheme has been under-used while international prices were 
higher than Chinese domestic ones.   
Because Beijing attained WTO market access goals well ahead of schedule, 
import tariff rates no longer provide the same overall trend of trade liberalization 
indications used by Rosen et al.  In 2008, in the midst of a food crisis, various export 
countries protected their domestic market price by enacting export restrictions.  Studying 
the use of export tariffs and quotas could potentially provide future analysts with new 
ways to analyze changes in market access and liberalization trends.  The institutions that 
regulate trade could also provide a better area of study than the simple tariff rate amount.  
As these institutions transition away from heavy government influence perhaps domestic 
business will start to have more control.  Tariff rates are no longer the key indicator for 
trade liberalization; perhaps the institutions affected by them will now provide better 
ways to analyze Chinese trade.    
2. Export Subsidies 
Export subsidies also lack any overarching numbers or commodities to study 
regarding China.  The fact that China has no agriculture export subsides makes it one of 
the most liberal trade regimes in the world, something that even the United States and the 
European Union cannot match.  But because there are no official subsidies does not mean 
that the pillar does not remain one that needs to be examined.  As shown in Chinese corn, 
even as China stated it had no subsidies on corn, land use showed differently.  Land use 
remains a key indicator for potential distortions and should be looked at to determine if 
China has reversed course now that it has attained a market undistorted by export 
subsidies. 
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3. Domestic Supports 
The domestic support pillar provides the one negative mark in the trade 
liberalization study.  China has provided no official domestic support data since 2004, 
and the data Beijing did provide only covered 1999-2001.  Since then China has put off 
calls to provide updated numbers.  Beijing agreed to an AMS limit lower than the one 
offered, 8.5% instead of 10%.  Rosen et al, after reviewing the data provided for 1999-
2001, suggested the actual AMS rate was probably much lower than that.  Since then, 
agriculture budgets increased substantially, rising from Yuan 123 billion in 2000 to Yuan 
563 billion in 2008 with additional agriculture subsidies mentioned throughout the time 
period to curb or overcome the effects of disasters and weather.  Beijing is either 
surprised or embarrassed to see that its AMS rate was above its self-imposed limit of 
8.5% or that it simply cannot tabulate nor account for where all the money has gone to in 
the rural sector.  Assuming Beijing has been able to calculate the numbers and account 
for the money, it is then either waiting until its AMS rate is below 8.5% or until releasing 
numbers for early years is irrelevant.  Beijing will be recalcitrant in releasing any 
embarrassing numbers until the WTO has provided an incentive to do so; up until now 
the WTO has not provide Beijing with one. 
4. Food Crisis 2008 and Beijing’s Reaction Evaluated 
Outside the three pillars but with the domestic realm, one activity does warrant 
further discussion.  Beijing’s reaction to the 2008 food crisis showed that while it 
embarked on trade liberalization, the state still existed and could exert rapid and effective 
control.  Private fertilizer companies could not export and take advantage of rising world 
prices.  The grain trade experienced similar conditions.  The state had exerted controls in 
such a way to keep domestic prices low without actually nationalizing private enterprises.  
China’s reactions to the food crisis revealed that China remained ready to reverse trade 
liberalization as soon as it began to adversely affect the Chinese people and social 
stability though price instability.  Beijing will only allow market liberalization as long as 
the benefit to society exists.  Once a threat exists, it will act to maintain social stability.  It 
should be emphasized though that the Chinese government acted within the mechanisms 
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of the market to control trade and did not just nationalize the necessary areas.  Its reaction 
was fairly transparent and open to the rest of the WTO membership and when the crisis 
abated, it relaxed its controls.  While the reaction was protectionist, it does show that 
China has come along way from its crazed days of a controlled economy.  As institutions 
are strengthened and players other than the CCP gain power to influence the government, 
such reactions could be harder to implement in the future.  
B. NEGOTIATIONS IMPLICATIONS 
China’s negotiations stances in WTO agriculture negotiations were not expected 
to change much in the last five years.  China maintained a consistent stance in market 
access areas, export subsidies, and in domestic supports.  Over the five year period, the 
stances appeared to harden as they have gained support by other developing member 
nations.  Rosen et al. predicted some of these stances would change; they have not.   
1. Market Access 
China did not back away from its support of developing member nations and 
recently acceded nations in negotiations.  This is not surprising given the amount of 
change China has embraced to join the WTO.  China’s position called for extended 
timelines and gradual reductions for developing nations.  Beijing also called for an extra 
extension for recently acceded members, as these nations have embraced more in-depth 
changes than have other members.  In essence, China’s overall timeline for change is one 
where developed nations lower their tariffs first, and then developing nations gradually 
meet the tariff level attained by the developed nations.  Only after developed and 
developing nations have lowered their tariffs will recently acceded members (China 
included as a RAM) meet that level.  With hypothetical numbers to illustrate the idea:  
All WTO members agree to a tariff reduction and all begin to reduce tariffs.  Developed 
nations reach the mark in three years, developing nations reach it in five years, and the 
recently acceded nations reach the mark in ten years (China has presented a proposal 
asking for an additional five years).  These gradual reductions would allow developing 
country markets to slowly adapt to the changed market access.   
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In theory this gradual reduction would work except China, India, and most of the 
developing world have asked for special and differential treatment on certain products.  
These few products requested would be protected with a different set of tariff rules.  
Unfortunately, the products listed are those agriculture products the developed world also 
produces.  So whatever modality is agreed to would not widely open market access to the 
specific products developed members desire to export because of these requested 
protections.  China’s combined stance on these two issues makes any formal resolution 
difficult to attain.  The developed world has little to gain by opening their markets if their 
exports are to be met by higher tariffs; so a stalemate in negotiations will likely occur 
based on the requested protections. Having gained support from the developing world 
though, China is unlikely to change its stance in the future as well. 
2. Export Subsidies 
China’s negotiation stance on export subsidies has not changed either, nor was it 
expected to.  Beijing eliminated all export subsidies and has nothing to gain by allowing 
other members to maintain such subsidies.  Subsidies artificially lower the price on the 
world market, making other countries’ exports worth less.  Tied to the above market 
access argument, it gives that product an unfair advantage and allows a foreign producer 
to take more of a domestic market share; it grants artificial market access.  In the five 
years studied, 2004-2008, China repeatedly called for an elimination of these subsidies.  
Beijing will likely continue to support elimination because of its long-established trend 
against subsidies, its domestic actions removing them, and the negative effects other 
members’ export subsidies have on Chinese markets. 
3. Domestic Supports Governance 
Domestic supports fall into a similar category with export subsidies.  China 
continues to claim it has no price distorting supports, though Beijing has failed to support 
that claim with official spending notifications to the WTO.  It calls to better govern the 
Green Box, further reduce the Blue Box and eliminate supports above Amber Box limits.  
Not all countries have access to the Blue Box and Beijing maintains that the Blue Box 
provides member nations additional unfair advantages.  Domestic supports that distort the 
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price of a product need to be eliminated for these supports again grant artificial market 
access and competition on developing countries’ markets.  China and its trade allies 
highlight the huge agriculture budget differences between the developed and developing 
world and hold that even Green Box supports can have second and third order effects that 
distort agriculture trade.  For that reason, China continues to advocate drastic reductions 
in developed nation farm supports and better governance to eliminate those Green Box 
supports that actually distort trade.  China is unlikely to back away from this stance as it 
has gained considerable support with other developing country members. 
4. China in the SCC 
China’s participation in the Sub-Committee on Cotton also reflected its larger 
market access and price distortion concerns.  The cotton industry and linked textile 
industry employ more workers in China than all workers currently employed in the 
United States.  The textile trade contributed directly to the trade surplus China has 
experienced.  It is not surprising then that maintaining domestic production and access to 
fair priced cotton on the international market will remain a key Chinese interest.  The 
SCC provided China an additional venue to present its stances in all trade pillars.  China 
will not back away from whatever advantage it can gain in the cotton market.  Too much 
is at stake for Chinese workers and Beijing’s international market share in cotton and 
textiles.         
5. Food Crisis 2008 and Beijing’s Negotiations Evaluated 
China maintained very specific stances over five years, through the failed 
negotiations in 2003 and 2006.  It is no surprise that China maintained such stances in 
2008 at Geneva.  China had negotiated the twists and turns of the accession process to 
join the WTO through compromise.  Now China belonged to the WTO and no longer had 
to continue to compromise its market stances.  China could now focus on its own market 
interests.  Hardened stances and a hesitance to compromise should not be seen as a 
retrenchment to protectionism.   
China endured 17 years of accession talks; DDA is only in its eighth year.  In 
2003, strong developing nation organizations emerged from the ashes of the failed talks 
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in Cancun and began to influence the path negotiations would later take.  In 2006, more 
nations saw the benefit of negotiating from a consolidated position.  Since accession, 
China developed the confidence, expertise, and alliance structure to drive towards the 
most advantageous deal for its markets.  What are the larger implications of the 
negotiations alliances?  
C. ALLIANCE IMPLICATIONS 
The G-20 emerged after the Cancun talks collapse in 2003, with China as a 
member.  The G-20 first coordinated with the G-33 and then was invited to coordinate 
with a larger group of trade ministers in Hong Kong following the collapse of 
negotiations in 2006.  Since then, both China and the G-20 have referred to coordination 
with other developing groups that encompass 85 WTO members.  Over the past five 
years more and more representatives for the individual groups have spoken in favor of G-
20 initiatives.  China siding with India at Geneva in 2008 should not be surprising given 
the prior coordination that occurred between the two countries within the G-20.  With 
more countries supporting G-20 positions, India and China could be working to create a 
consortium of developing nations to trade with outside the controls of the WTO.  In 
March 2007, the G-20 mentioned the possibility of establishing bilateral relationships 
with the African Union in the field of cotton.161  Is this consortium a possibility? 
To answer the question it is first worthy to note that GATT existed with limited 
changes for 48 years until the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994 formed the WTO.  During 
this time the Soviet Union member states and China traded with members of GATT 
through bilateral trade agreements.  Inside GATT and the WTO, various regional 
agreements exist that provide more favorable trade conditions than even the WTO offers.  
The formation of the European Union is probably the largest of these agreements; others 
include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  The WTO survives even as these other organizations 
offer better trade conditions than does the larger WTO.  Since joining the WTO, China 
has maintained and also increased its bilateral trade agreements.  During the Trade Policy 
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Review in 2008, Beijing stated it had “a total of 12 regional trade arrangements involving 
29 countries and regions have been either signed by China or still in the process of 
negotiations.”162  It is entirely possible that China through the G-20 has entered into 
negotiations with other nations to meet the collective needs of developing country 
farmers.  Negotiations stances, trade agreements, and trade numbers need to be further 
examined to determine the likelihood of such an agreement. 
The implications of a new free trade agreement are immense.  Developing 
member food exporters would gain additional market accesses.  Tariff reductions could 
normalize the cost of food throughout the developing world while not having to deal with 
the barriers initiated by the developed members.  These farmers would have to account 
for the existing tariffs placed by the WTO, making their subsidized crops still more 
expensive.  Nations with a TRQ scheme in place could manage requests so that in-rate 
quotas are assigned to developing nations, leaving developed members with the higher 
out-tariff rates.  Developed members would have to further subsidize and support their 
farmers in order for them to compete, which violates existing WTO agreements.  The 
developed world would then either have to negotiate better market access in some sort of 
DDA II or abandon its attempts to access various developing world markets in primary 
commodities.  High quality food exports and specialty crop trade would still continue, for 
it is in these areas the developed world maintains a distinct advantage.  While this is a 
worse case scenario it does show that China has other options to develop its markets 
outside the WTO and further research is required to determine the financial effects such 
an alliance would have on United States farm markets.   
The WTO forced China’s markets to open and promoted trade liberalization and 
market access.  When a food crisis emerged, the PRC intervened to control prices and 
slow the adverse effects of global food price increases.  As danger passed, the 
government loosened its controls.  China will continue to liberalize at its own pace now 
that it has met almost all of its WTO commitments.  Beijing will use market tools to  
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expand market access wherever beneficial to its people.  Many tools exist for Beijing to 
accomplish that and over the last five years Beijing has become more adept at using 
them.   
 In December 2008, President Hu Jintao told an international forum, "the 
experience in the past three decades tells us, the decision on adopting reform and 
opening-up has been in agreement with the people's thoughts, compatible with modern 
tides, and completely right."163  The international open market is here to stay in China. 
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APPENDIX:  NEGOTIATIONS GROUPS’ MEMBERSHIP 
A large number of trade groups exist within the international system and it is
useful to list them along with their members; countries can belong to more than one 
group.  In some groups, membership is self-selected based on which ministers attended 
various meetings on the side of more formal negotiations.  Not all members belong to the 
World Trade Organization.164 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)   
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, 
Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe  
African Group 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Congo (Democratic Republic), Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) 
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts 
and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname 
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Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali 
G-20 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
G-33 
Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, China, Congo, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Mauritius, 
Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, 
Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
G-90 
Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea (Conakry), Guinea Bissau, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, 
Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & 
the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, The Gambia, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Least Developed Countries (LDC) 
Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the, Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nepal , Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, 
Togo, Uganda, Zambia  
Non-Agriculture Market Access—11 (NAMA-11) 
Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Namibia, 
Philippines, South Africa, Tunisia   
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Recently Acceded Members (RAM) 
Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Ecuador, FYR Macedonia, Jordan, Kyrgyz 
Rep., Moldova, Mongolia, Oman, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Chinese Taipei, Ukraine 
Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVE) 
Barbados, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, 
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